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Government
and
Elections
Formation in Iraq: An Analysis of
the Judiciary's Role
Charles P. Trumbull IV
Julie B. Martin*

ABSTRACT

In 2005, the people of Iraq ratified a permanent
Constitution, a significant milestone in the journey from
Saddam Hussein's authoritarianrule to democraticgovernance.
Among the Constitution's fundamental guarantees are the
separation and balance of powers, the selection of Parliament
through regular and periodic popular election, and an
independent judiciary empowered as the authority on
constitutional interpretation. Iraq's commitment to democracy
and the Constitution was put to the test five years later with the
first parliamentary election under the new Constitution. The
run-up to the elections was marred by political disputes,
violence, and legal challenges, as Iraqis argued over
controversial amendments to the Election Law and the
disqualification of hundreds of candidatespursuant to the deBa'athification laws. Following the hotly debated elections,
Iraqi leaders continued to argue over who had the first right to
form the government, causing a political deadlock that lasted
over six months. By the end of 2010, however, the newly elected
Parliamentapproved a new Council of Ministers, concluding a
largely peaceful transition of power in accordance with the
Constitution.
This Article examines these historic events, focusing on the
role of the Iraqi courts in resolving disputes throughout the
electoral and government formation processes. After analyzing
key decisions from Iraqi courts, it concludes that Iraq's
judiciary is emerging as a reliable, independent, and neutral
Through its measured and careful
arbiter of disputes.
jurisprudence,the judiciary is fostering a political culture that
respects and upholds the rule of law.
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In 2002, Iraqis went to the polls to choose their nation's leader.
The only hitch was that Saddam Hussein, the nation's President
since 1979, was the only name on the ballot. Not surprisingly,
Hussein was "elected" to another seven-year term. According to
Government of Iraq officials, 100 percent of the 11,445,638 eligible
voters cast their ballot in support of Saddam Hussein, up from the
99.96 percent who voted for Saddam in the previous referendum.'

* The authors served consecutively as Legal Adviser for the United States Embassy
in Baghdad, Iraq, in 2009 and 2010, and are currently attorney-advisers in the Office of
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The election results were widely dismissed by international observers
and Iraqi opposition groups in exile. The government's claim that
100 percent of eligible voters went to the polls was absurd, and those
voters who did turn out knew that they could be imprisoned, or
worse, for voting "no" to another seven years of dictatorship. An Iraqi
opposition leader living in Iran called the referendum "[t]otally
fabricated, and a complete fiasco." 2 Ari Flescher, White House
spokesman, commented, "Obviously it's not a very serious day, not a
very serious vote and nobody places any credibility on it."3
Less than eight years later, Iraqis prepared for another election
but under drastically different circumstances. The elections were the
first to be held under the 2005 Constitution, which guaranteed all
Iraqi citizens "the right to participate in public affairs and to enjoy
political rights including the right to vote, elect, and run for office." 4
Unlike in 2002, voters would be able to choose from among the six
thousand candidates running for Parliament, which would then
approve the Council of Ministers and elect the President. The Iraqi
government invited numerous international observers, including
officials from the United States Embassy and the United Nations
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), to monitor the elections, and it
made provisions for "special [needs] voting" and out-of-country voting
in sixteen countries. 5
On March 7, 2010, approximately twelve million Iraqis went to
the polls despite al-Qaeda's attempts to disrupt the elections.6
President Obama praised the elections, stating that the vote made it
"clear that the future of Iraq belongs to the people of Iraq."7 UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon "welcomed the overall integrity and

the Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State. The authors have written this
Article in their personal capacities, and the views expressed do not necessarily
represent those of the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Department of State, or the U.S.
Government.
2002,
Oct.
16,
BBC NEWs,
100% of Vote,
Saddam Wins
1.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil2331951.stm.
John Esterbrook, Saddam Hussein Wins One-Man Race, CBS NEWS, Oct.
2.
7
16, 2002, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/10/16/attack/main5257 0.shtml.
1.
note
Vote,
supra
of
100%
Wins
Saddam
3.
Article 20, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
4.
of Iraq] of 2005.
U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ [UNAMI], UNAMI ELECTORAL
5.
ASSISTANCE OFFICE, FACT SHEET: 2010 IRAQ PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: LEGAL
FRAMEWORK AND OPERATIONAL PLANNING FACTS (2010), http://www.uniraq.org/
documents/ElectoralMaterial/280110/UNAMIEAOFact%2OSheet_2010%2OCoR%20E
lections_20100128_EN.pdf.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
6.
Paragraph6 of Resolution 1883 (2009), 11 3, 6, 55, U.N. Doc. S/2010/240 (May 14,
2010). According to the United Nations, approximately 62.4 percent of eligible voters
cast a ballot in the elections. Id. 3.
Steven R. Hurst, Analysis: For Obama, Iraq Elections Are Good News, ABC
7.
2
NEWS, Mar. 8, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=100388 4.
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transparency of the electoral process, which was widely assessed as
having been conducted according to international standards." Iraqis
celebrated in streets across the country, voters proudly displayed
their purple ink-stained fingers, and Western diplomats expressed
audible sighs of relief.
The March 7 election was a milestone for Iraq and the region,
but it was just one step in the long and twisted path to a democratic
Iraq. The months leading up to the elections were marred by political
disputes, violence, and legal challenges, as Iraqi leaders bickered over
controversial amendments to the Election Law. 9 The disqualification
of hundreds of candidates pursuant to the de-Ba'athification laws
brought Iraq to the brink of renewed sectarian warfare. Following
the elections, Iraqis faced the more daunting (and at times seemingly
impossible) challenge of forming a government in accordance with the
Ayad Allawi's
procedures set forth by the Constitution.
predominately Sunni coalition won a slim plurality of parliamentary
seats, leading to numerous legal challenges by Nouri al-Maliki, the
incumbent Prime Minister, as to both the election results and
individual candidate eligibility. Even after the results had been
certified by the Iraqi Supreme Court, politicians continued to argue
for months over who had the right to form the government, causing
shifting alliances, a dangerous vacuum of power, and an ominous
uptick in violence.
This Article examines the winding yet historic road to democratic
elections in Iraq and the subsequent government-formation process.
In particular, it discusses the legal challenges that Iraqi actors
confronted and analyzes the judiciary's approach to resolving these
disputes. It demonstrates that throughout this process, the Iraqi
courts showed a remarkable resilience to political pressure, and
issued decisions that were both legally defensible and generally
accepted by diverse political actors and the Iraqi public. Throughout
the election saga, a precarious time in the nation's history, courts
reinforced judicial independence and the authority of the rule of law,
cementing the judiciary's role as a neutral arbiter of disputes
pertaining to governance.
Part I places the March 2010 election in its historical and
political context. Part II analyzes the passage of the controversial
amendments to the Election Law, including the veto by Vice

U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 6, T 8. Ad Melkert, the Special
8.
Representative of the Secretary General, similarly praised the Iraqi election officials
for "their efforts to conduct elections in a well organized and professional fashion."
Press Release, UNAMI, Statement from the Special Representative of the Secretary
General for Iraq, Ad Melkert, on the National Iraqi Elections (Mar. 9, 2010), available
86
.
at http://www.uniraq.org/newsroom/getarticle.asp?ArticlelD=12
See discussion infra Part II (providing an overview of the disruptions
9.
leading up to the elections, most of which centered around the Ba'ath party).
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President al-Hashimi and the last-minute compromise that salvaged
the elections. Part III examines the de-Ba'athification process that
threatened to reignite a Sunni insurgency and the difficult appeals
that the courts were required to resolve. Part IV discusses the legal
challenges to the election results and the subsequent recount, and
Part V examines the Federal Supreme Court's (FSC or the Court)
interpretation of a constitutional provision at the center of the
government-formation controversy. Finally, Part VI analyzes the
judiciary's approach to dealing with these controversial legal
questions and challenges the views of commentators who question the
independence of Iraqi courts. Part VI ultimately concludes that the
integrity of the judiciary throughout this process ensured the
legitimacy of the elections and helped promote public confidence in
the democratic process and the rule of law.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The TransitionalPeriod
In 2003, a UN Multi-National Force (MNF-I) overthrew the
regime of Saddam Hussein and placed Iraq on a long and bloody path
to democracy. 1 0 The United States and the United Kingdom assumed
the role of occupying powers,' 1 and they quickly established the
Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by L. Paul Bremer,
as the governing authority. 12 Shortly after, Bremer formed the Iraqi
Governing Council (IGC), which was composed of twenty-five
prominent Iraqis who were selected primarily from the pre-war
opposition groups.' 3 The IGC's principal functions were to advise the
CPA, propose legislation, and draft an interim constitution (under
close supervision by American officials).1 4 On March 8, 2004, the IGC
adopted an interim constitution, called the Law of Administration for

10.

See generally PATRICK COCKBURN, THE OCCUPATION: WAR AND RESISTANCE

IN IRAQ (2006) (focusing on the invasion of Iraq and why it caused great resistance by
the Iraqi population).
S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl. para. 14, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003)
11.
(recognizing these nations' authority as occupying powers and describing the specific
responsibilities that accompany this role).
KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21968, IRAQ: POLITICS,
12.
ELECTIONS, AND BENCHMARKS 1 (2010).

The UN Security Council welcomed the formation of the IGC, which it
13.
described as "broadly representative" of Iraqi society. See S.C. Res. 1500, 1 1, U.N. Doc.
SIRES/1500 (Aug. 14, 2003) (noting that the Council was an important step towards
the formation of a "representative government").
Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, ConstitutionalPolitics and Text in the
14.
New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 890-91

(2006).
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the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (TAL). 15 The TAL went
into effect on June 28, 2004, the same day that the CPA dissolved and
transferred governing authority to the Iraqi Interim Government,
headed by Ayad Allawi. 16
In January 2005, Iraq held its first national election since the
fall of the Hussein regime to select the Transitional National
Assembly, the body that would be responsible for drafting the
permanent constitution.1 7 Pursuant to CPA Order 96, the country
was composed of a single constituency, and Iraqis were required to
vote for a single political party list rather than individual
candidates.1 8 Seats were distributed to the political lists based on the
percentage of votes received. 19 Sunnis largely boycotted the elections,
resulting in predominately Shia and Kurd membership in the
Transitional National Assembly.2 0
The Constitution was approved on October 15, 2005, in a
national referendum following months of heated negotiations that
"very nearly ripped the country apart."21
The Constitution
established a parliamentary democracy based on "the principle of
separation of powers."2 2 Members of the Council of Representatives
(CoR or Parliament) serve four-year terms and are elected through a
"direct secret general ballot." 23 The Prime Minister, as head of the
Council of Ministers (CoM), "is the direct executive authority
responsible for the general policy of the State and the commander-inchief of the armed forces." 24 The Prime Minister is nominated by the
largest parliamentary bloc and is responsible for forming the CoM,
which must be approved by a majority of the CoR.2 5 The President,
elected by a two-thirds majority of the CoR, plays a largely

15.
Id. at 895-96.
16.
CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ 292 (3d rev. ed. 2007).
17.
Feldman & Martinez, supra note 14, at 897.
18.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 96, The Electoral Law, pmbl.
para. 7, Doc. No. CPA/ORD/7 June 04/96 (June 15, 2004).
19.
Id. sec. 3.
20.
Feldman & Martinez, supra note 14, at 897. The United Iraqi Alliance
(UIA), an alliance of Shia religious parties, won over half of the seats. Id.
21.
Feisal Amin Rasoul al-Istrabadi, A Constitution Without Constitutionalism:
Reflections on Iraq's FailedConstitutionalProcess, 87 TEx. L. REV. 1627, 1627-28, 1641
(2007). The Constitution, which required approval by a majority of voters, was
approved by a narrow margin. However, any three provinces could veto the
Constitution if voters rejected it by a two-thirds majority. Two Sunni provinces voted
against the proposed Constitution by an overwhelming majority. A thirdpredominately Sunni province-also rejected the Constitution, but fell short of the
required two-thirds majority. Id. at 1641. For an overview of the negotiating history of
the Constitution, see Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A
DraftingHistory, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 25 (2007).
22.
Article 47, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
23.
Id. arts. 49, 56.
24.
Id. art. 78.
25.
Id. art. 76.
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ceremonial role and acts as a "symbol of the unity of the country and
represents the sovereignty of the country." 26 Article 138, however,
established a Presidency Council, composed of a president and two
vice presidents, to serve in place of the President for the CoR's first
electoral term. 27 The Presidency Council was granted significantly
more power than the President, including, within certain constraints,
the authority to veto legislation passed by the CoR.28 In addition, the
Constitution stated that "there is no authority over [judges] except
that of the law," establishing an independent judiciary.29 The FSC
was granted jurisdiction over "overseeing the constitutionality of
laws," "interpreting provisions of the Constitution," settling disputes
between government entities, and certifying the final election results
for Parliament. 30
Iraqis returned to the polls on December 15, 2005, to elect the
first Parliament under the terms of the TAL, marking "the beginning
of the last phase of the political transition process" set forth therein.3 '
Pursuant to the Election Law of 2005, each of the eighteen provinces
constituted a separate electoral district and was awarded a share of
the 275 parliamentary seats in proportion "to the number of
registered voters in the governorate."3 2
Forty-five of the

26.
Id. arts. 67, 70. One notable exception to the figurehead role of the
President is the authority to ratify death sentences issued by a competent court. Id.
art. 73, sec. 8.
27.
Id. art. 138. The Presidency Council resulted from a compromise struck by
the drafters of the Constitution. The Shia religious parties, who predicted that they
would likely control a majority of seats in Parliament, were opposed to institutional
checks on the Parliament's power. Conversely, the Sunni and Kurds wanted a strong
Presidency Council with veto power that would help secure minority interests. In the
end, the drafters arrived at an accord whereby the Presidency Council would be in
place, but only for the first electoral term. Feldman & Martinez, supra note 14, at 912.
28.
The Constitution sets forth the Presidency Council's veto power as follows:
Legislation and decisions enacted by the Council of Representatives shall be
forwarded to the Presidency Council for their unanimous approval and for its
issuance within ten days from the date of delivery to the Presidency Council,
except the stipulations of Articles 118 and 119 that pertain to the formation of
regions.
Article 138, Section 5(A), Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005. Vetoed legislation is
returned to the CoR for reevaluation of the disputed issues. Id. art. 138, sec. 5(B). After
reevaluation, if the Presidency Council vetoes the legislation for a second time, the CoR
can override the veto by a three-fifths majority. Id. art. 138, sec. 5(C).
29.
Id. art. 88.
30.
Id. art. 93. Since the Constitution's enactment, the mechanism for
petitioning the FSC for review generally takes the form of a letter submitted by an
interested party.
31.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph30 of Resolution 1546 (2004), 1 3, U.N. Doc. S/2006/137 (Mar. 3, 2006).
32.
See Election Law No. 16 of 2005, art. 15 ("[Elach governorate ... shall be
allotted a number of seats proportional to the number of registered voters in the
governorate in accordance with the elections of January 30, 2005 'based on the public
distribution list."').
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parliamentary seats were reserved as "compensatory" seats,33 which
were distributed first to entities that obtained the "national average"
of votes nationwide but not enough votes in a single electoral district
to win a seat. 34 The remaining compensatory seats were distributed
to winning lists based on their overall vote count.3 5 Political parties
were required to present a separate list of candidates for each
province, and voters selected one of the competing lists of candidates
rather than individual candidates. 36 Under this "closed-list" system,
CoR seats were distributed to political parties based on vote counts,
and parties were awarded seats to individual candidates based on
their order on the parties' respective electoral lists. 37 As a result,
political parties could largely control which candidates would be
elected to the CoR by ranking them higher or lower on the list.
The United Iraqi Alliance (a Shia-Islamist coalition composed of
two main political parties, Dawa and the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)), winning a total of 46.5 percent of
the vote and 128 of the 275 parliamentary seats, emerged as the
largest political bloc, with a clear lead over the Kurdish coalition (53
seats) and the Sunni Iraqi Tawafuq Front (ITF) (44 seats).3 8
Parliament was called into session on March 16, 2006, at which time
the Constitution entered into force. 39 After a month of negotiation,
Nouri al-Maliki (Shia), a compromise candidate and Deputy Prime
Minister to Ibrahim al-Jaafari during the transitional government,
was nominated as Prime Minister. 40 The Council of Representatives
elected Jalal Talabani (Kurd) as President and Adel Abd al-Mahdi
(Shia) and Tariq al-Hashimi (Sunni) as the two Vice Presidents. 4 1
Id.
33.
34.
Id. art. 17. The national average is calculated by dividing the total number
of votes in Iraq by the number of total CoR seats (275). Thus, an entity that failed to
obtain sufficient votes in an electoral district could receive compensatory seats if the
number of votes it received exceeded the national average.
Id.
35.
Id. arts. 15, 18.
36.
Id. art. 12. For example, if a party received five seats in a particular
37.
province, the seats would be awarded to the first five candidates on the list.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 31, 1 12; Adeed Dawisha, Iraq: A Vote
38.
Against Sectarianism,J. DEMOCRACY, July 2010, at 26.
39.
Compare Article 144, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005 ("[The]
Constitution shall come into force . . . [upon] seating of the government that is formed
pursuant to this Constitution."), with KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 4 (2006) (giving the
date of the first meeting of the Council of Representatives).
40.
Al-Istrabadi, supra note 21, at 1650. The UIA initially nominated al-Jaafari
to continue as Prime Minister in the new government. However, this effort was twice
defeated due to his unpopularity with Sunnis and Kurds, who blamed al-Jaafari for
continued high levels of violence and sectarian strife during the transitional
government period. When it became apparent that Sunni and Kurd opposition to alJaafari was insurmountable, the UIA selected al-Maliki. Marina Ottaway & Danial
Kaysi, Who Will Be the Next Prime Minister of Iraq?, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L
PEACE (Apr. 5, 2010), http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa= view&id=40492.
41.
KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 4.
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Barham Salih (Kurd) and Salam al-Zubaie (Sunni) were positioned as
Deputy Prime Ministers. 42
B. Preparationsfor the 2010 Elections
In the second half of 2009, Iraq began to prepare for arguably the
most important election in its history. The circumstances of this
election were significantly different than the previous elections. It
would be the first election under the permanent Constitution and
would help gauge Iraqis' commitment to the democratic ideals
enshrined therein. Iraqis would see for the first time whether their
government leaders, who had been in power for four years, would
peacefully transfer that power to a newly elected government in
accordance with the Constitution.
Additionally, the American presence was much less visible in
2009 than in 2005. The UN Mandate for Multi-National Forces,
Security Council Resolution 1790, expired on December 31, 2008,43
leaving the Iraqi government solely responsible for the nation's
security. U.S. forces remained in Iraq pursuant to the bilateral U.S.Iraq Security Agreement,44 but all U.S. military operations had to be
agreed upon and coordinated with Iraqi authorities. 45 Furthermore,
pursuant to that agreement, U.S. forces had withdrawn all combat
troops "from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities" as of June 30, 2009.46
Violence had receded from its 2006-2007 highs, but a weakened
Sunni insurgency continued to "generat[e] bursts of bloodshed." 47
Therefore, these elections would be an important test for the Iraqi
security, military, and police forces as they attempted to prove that
they were capable of providing security for the country in the absence
of U.S. forces.
Finally, these elections would signal the direction of Iraq's
future. A victory for the Shia religious parties would move Iraq closer
to Iran, which financially backed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
(ISCI) and the Sadrist Trend, the two primary Shia religious

Id.
42.
43.
S.C. Res. 1790, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1790 (Dec. 18, 2007) (extending
authorization under its Chapter VII authorities for the multinational force in Iraq until
December 31, 2008). After the expiration of Resolution 1790, foreign forces could
remain in Iraq only at the invitation of the Iraqi government.
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq
44.
on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their
Activities During Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, Nov. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/militaryllibrary/policy/dodliraq-sofa.htm.
45.
Id. art. 4.
46.
Id. art. 24.
HANNAH FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40824, IRAQI CIVILIAN, POLICE,
47.
AND SECURITY FORCES CASUALTY STATISTICS 3 (2009).

340

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 44:331

parties. 48 Such an outcome could also alienate Sunnis and possibly
precipitate renewed sectarian warfare. An elected government with
significant Sunni, Kurd, and secular Shia representation, on the
other hand, could help Iraq overcome its destructive sectarianism and
promote national reconciliation.
New political alliances started to form in fall 2009. The main
Shia alliance from the 2005 elections, the United Iraqi Alliance, had
dissolved due to "political competition and armed combat."4 9 The
Shia parties thus split into three main coalitions: the State of Law
Coalition (SoL), the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), and the Iraqi
SoL, a quasi-secular and nationalist
Unity Alliance (IUA).5 0
coalition, was dominated by Prime Minister al-Maliki and his Dawa
Party but also included a few moderate Sunnis.5 1 The INA, a
predominately Shia religious party, included ISCI members, such as
Vice President Adel al-Mahdi, and candidates loyal to Moqtada alSadr, an anti-American cleric. 52 The third party, the IUA, was
headed by Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani, a former ally of
al-Maliki who formed his own party before the 2009 provincial
elections.5 3 The main Sunni party, Iraqiyya, was led by Ayad Allawi
(a secular Shia himself), Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, and
Deputy Prime Minister Rafa al-Assewi. 54 Lastly, the two main
Kurdish political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the
Dawisha, supra note 38, at 34 (describing ties between Iran and Shia
48.
parties); Michael R. Gordon, Meddling Neighbors Undercut Iraq's Political Stability,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2010, at All (discussing Iranian influence prior to the elections).
Al-Istrabadi, supra note 21, at 1651.
49.
KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 7-8 tbl.1 (providing an overview of the three
50.
major coalitions formed for the 2010 elections).
Dawisha, supra note 38, at 30.
51.
Id.
52.
The Iraqi Constitution provides for decentralized federalism, granting
53.
significant powers to both "regions," such as the Kurdistan Region, and to a lesser
extent to "provinces" that are not incorporated into a region. See Articles 116-23,
Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005 (giving regions the power to adopt a constitution
and a general mandate to exercise executive, legislative, and judicial power). In 2008,
in accordance with Article 122 of the Constitution, the Iraqi Parliament passed the
Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region, more commonly known as the
Provincial Powers Law (PPL) Law No. 21 of 2008. Iraq Presidency Passes Provincial
Powers Law, REUTERS, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2008/03/19/usiraq-provinces-law-idUSL1926004520080319. The PPL established popularly elected
"provincial councils" in each province that would act as the "highest legislative and
oversight authority" within each province. Provincial Powers Law No. 21 of 2008, art.
2. The Provincial Councils are authorized, among other things, to promulgate local
laws, prepare the provincial budget, and monitor the performance of local executive
authorities. Id. art. 7. The Provincial Council is also responsible for electing the
provincial governor, the highest-ranking executive officer in the province. Id. art. 24.
The first provincial elections took place on January 31, 2009, and al-Maliki's SoL
Coalition fared especially well, particularly in Baghdad province where it won twentyeight of the fifty-seven seats on the Council. KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 4, 6.
54.
Iraq Opposition Names Candidates, AL JAZEERA, Jan. 16, 2010,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/01/2010116105225902503.html.
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Kurdistan Democratic Party, once bitter rivals,5 5 reaffirmed their
commitment to a single Kurdish alliance.5 6
The administration of the elections was delegated to the
Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), an independent
electoral authority subject to the "supervision" of the CoR.5 7 IHEC's
primary responsibilities include establishing and updating voter
registries, certifying political entities and candidate lists,
adjudicating electoral complaints and appeals, and setting
regulations for the electoral process. 58 It is also authorized by statute
to promulgate rules for federal, regional, and local elections; to
organize and oversee all federal and regional elections; and to settle
disputes arising from elections.59
II.

AMENDING THE

2005 ELECTION

LAW

The first obstacle to holding legitimate elections was the Election
Law itself. In September 2005, concurrently with its deliberation
over the text of the Constitution, the Transitional National Assembly
enacted the Election Law in anticipation of the December
parliamentary elections. 60 The overlap between the Election Law and
the constitutional deliberation was unavoidable. The Election Law's
predecessor, CPA Order 96, was promulgated thirteen days prior to
the CPA's dissolution and established a closed-list system with one
national electoral district for the TAL's January 2005 election. 6 ' The
Transitional National Assembly, while recognizing that CPA Order
96 was "suitable in its time," sought in passing the 2005 Election Law
to set in place a more representative multiple-district electoral
system. 62 Although it is arguably more representative than the CPAimposed system, the multiple-district method of apportionment
introduced an element of high-stakes political wrangling over how the
seats would be allocated among the governorates.

See TRIPP, supra note 16, at 205 (describing the split between the Kurdish
55.
alliances, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan); see
generally DAVID McDOWALL, A MODERN HISTORY OF THE KURDs 302-27 (3d ed. 2004)
(reviewing the history of the Kurds and their efforts to achieve independence, today
primarily led by a single alliance).
56.
KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 8.
57.
Law of the Independent High Electoral Commission Law No. 11 of 2007,
secs. 1-2.
Id. sec. 4.
58.
Id. sec. 2.
59.
60.
Election Law No. 11 of 2005 (entered into the Iraqi Official Gazette in
September 2005).
61.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 96, supra note 18, secs. 1, 3.
62.
Election Law No. 11 of 2005, app. (Reasons for the Law).
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A. ConstitutionalChallenge to the 2005 Election Law
In 2006, on the heels of the parliamentary election and the entry
into force of the Constitution, the Iraqi Tawafuq Front (ITF), led by
Vice President al-Hashimi, petitioned the FSC to review the
constitutionality of Article 15 of the Election Law. It argued that
Article 15, which stated that each governorate "shall be allotted a
number of seats proportional to the number of registered voters in the
governorate," 63 presented a clear violation of the Constitution's
requirement that parliamentary seats be allotted on the basis of "one
seat per every 100,000 Iraqi persons representing the entire Iraqi
people." 64 The ITF further argued that continued application of
Article 15 would "cause damage and injustice to the provinces [of]
Ninewa, Salah al Din, Diyala and Babil."65
The Court agreed, holding: "Article 49/first of the constitution
adopted the criteria of (1) seat for each (100,000) of the Iraqi
population unlike the criteria adopted in article 15/second of the
elections law No. 16 of/2005 in which the criteria of the registered
voters in each province was adopted." 66 Noting that pursuant to
Article 13(2) of the Constitution "any law that is in contradiction with
the constitution . .. shall be invalid," the Court opined that "the

legislator may legislate a new law that is consistent with the
67
provisions of article 49/first of the constitution."
B. The November 8, 2009 Amendment and Subsequent Veto
Although the FSC rendered its opinion in 2007, Parliament did
not propose new legislation until late 2009, when planning for the
upcoming election was already underway.68 The opinion posed a
significant challenge: how to determine CoR representation under the
terms of the Constitution without reliable population data. The last
census dated back to 1997 and did not include data for the three

63.
Id. art. 15.
Article 49, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005; Al-Mahkama
64.
al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya [Federal Supreme Court], decision No. 15/t/2006 of April 26,
2007, available at http://www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/tawafuq.vsspeaker-size-ofcor-eng.doc.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 15/t/2006. The
65.
populations of Ninewa, Salah al Din, and Diyala are mostly Sunni. It is noteworthy
that the ITF, a Sunni Islamic coalition, singled out the mostly Shi'a province of Babil in
addition to the three Sunni provinces. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT'L STUD., THE UNCERTAIN SECURITY SITUATION INIRAQ 4 (2010).
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 15/t/2006.
66.
Id.
67.
See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
68.
14, U.N. Doc. S/2009/393 (July 30, 2009)
Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1830 (2008),
(describing UNAMI's ongoing work with the Electoral Commission).
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Kurdish provinces of Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah. 69 As a result,
population statistics in several provinces were fiercely contested by
Kurds and Arabs, especially in the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.70
Moreover, a new census was not feasible for practical and political
reasons. Even if a census could be orchestrated before January 2010,
the soft target for an election date, it very likely would not be possible
to tabulate reliable results within that timeframe.7 1 In light of these
tensions, Iraqi leaders were deeply divided on the terms of new
legislation since dictating the ultimate distribution of seats per
province also dictated the distribution by religious sect and
ethnicity.72
After missing several self-imposed deadlines, the CoR finally
approved several amendments to the 2005 Election Law on November
8, 2009, in a nationally televised session.7 3 The bill made three
salient changes to the 2005 Election Law. First, it repealed Article 15
and stated that the "CoR consists of [a] number of seats at a ratio of
one seat for every hundred thousand people based on the latest
statistics submitted by the Ministry of Trade."74 The formula for
distributing seats to governorates would thus be based on Ministry of
Trade (MoT) ration card lists rather than the number of registered
voters in each governorate.7 5 The MoT statistics were unlikely to
account for the actual Iraqi population because some Iraqis,
especially those living overseas, did not receive food rations.
Nevertheless, the up-to-date ration card registry was assessed to
provide a better, or at least less controversial, approximation of the
Iraqi population than the outdated voter registries, various iterations
of which had been proposed and rejected as suitable proxies.76 The

Press Release, United Nations, Press Briefing on Iraq Demographics (Aug.
69.
8, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2003/iraqdemobrf.doc.htm;
see also Dawisha, supra note 38, at 29 (listing the three Kurdish provinces).
Iraq Aims to Conduct Census in a Single Day, ASSYRIAN INT'L NEWSPAPER,
70.
July 26, 2004, http://www.aina.org/news/20040726020450.htm.
Id. In fact, plans for a new census had been revived in mid-2008, but were
71.
halted in the fall of 2009 out of concern that the census would lead to violence in areas
along the disputed Kurdish border. At the time, the Iraqi government stated that it
would take two years to release the results. Iraq to Hold National Census in 2009,
REUTERS, May 28, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL28863809; Central
Bureau of Statistics Plans for New Census, NIQASH (June 15, 2009),
http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypelD=74&id=2464&lang-0.
See KATzMAN, supra note 12, at 8-9 (discussing the Election Law dispute).
72.
Id.; see also Council of RepresentativesPasses Amendment to 2005 Elections
73.
Law, GLOBAL JUSTICE PROJECT: IRAQ (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.gjpi.org/2009/11/
08/council-of-representatives-passes-amendment-to-2005-elections-law (detailing specific
amendment provisions).
74.
Amendment of Election Law No. 16 of 2009, art. 1.
75.
See id. (describing the formula for distributing seats).
76.
For instance, at one point, Arab contingents favored using the 2004 voter
registry, Turks favored the 1957 registry, and Kurds the 2009 registry. Reaching an
agreement that one of the existing voter registries accurately reflected the current
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amendment did not explicitly state the number of CoR seats in the
next Parliament, but the CoR informally agreed that the MoT data
would increase the number of CoR seats to 323.77
Second, the CoR reduced the number of "compensatory" seats
from 15 percent of the total seats to 5 percent, which included eight
minority group seats, five of which were designated for Christians
and one seat was designated for the Yazidi, Sabi'I Manda'ian, and
Shabaki groups respectively, to be allocated in provinces with a
significant population presence.7 8 The remaining compensatory seats
would be allocated to national lists based on their total percentage,
including out-of-country votes, of the national vote.79
Third, the amendments provided that "nomination shall be
according to the open list and the number of candidates shall be no
less than three and not exceeding the double number of the seats
allocated to the constituency."8 0 The open-list system gave voters
(rather than political parties) significantly more influence in selecting
their representatives, because they could vote for either individual
candidates or the party's electoral list.81 Regardless of their initial
place on the party's list, candidates would be awarded seats based on

Iraqi population would have been exceedingly difficult. Denise Natali, Election
Imbroglio in Iraq Kurdistan, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (Feb. 22, 2010),
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=view&id=31021.
77.
Jim Muir, Will Disputes Derail Iraq's Election?, BBC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilmiddle-east/8367507.stm; Marina Ottaway & Danial Kaysi,
Election Law, Take Two, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (2009),
In a related
http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24251.
amendment, the CoR provided that votes in the city of Kirkuk and "provinces with
dubious registries" would be subject to a special review in order to correct voting
registries if it was determined that large population increases in recent years
undermined existing demographic data. Amendment of Election Law No. 16 of 2009,
art. 6. The amendment defined locales with "dubious registries" as those whose annual
population growth exceeds 5 percent. Id. To trigger the review mechanism, a petition
signed by fifty CoR members had to pass by a simple majority of the CoR. Id.
Underscoring the extreme political sensitivity attendant to holding polls in Kirkuk and
certain key provinces, the amendment provided that results in those areas "shall not be
considered a foundation for any future or past electoral process for making any political
or administrative arrangements before concluding the inspection of the said registries."
Id.
Seats were allocated as follows: Christians (Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk,
78.
Dahuk, and Erbil); Yazidi (Ninewa); Sabi'I Manda'ian (Baghdad); and Shabaki
(Ninewa). Amendment of Election Law No. 16 of 2009, art. 1; Muir, supra note 77.
79.
KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 9. According to UNAMI, approximately 264,000
and 368,000 out-of-country votes were cast in the January and December 2005
elections respectively. Sabah Abdul-Rahma, Stage Preparationsfor the Out-of-Country
Voting: Interview with Svetlana Golkina, Public Outreach Advisor, Office of Electoral
Assistance, UNAMI FOCUS, Jan. 2010, at 5. The Secretary General's figures for the
December 2005 election are slightly lower, recording the number of valid votes at
295,377. U.N. Secretary- General, supra note 31, T 12.
Amendment of Election Law No. 16 of 2009, art. 3, sec. 1; U.N. Secretary80.
General, supranote 31, 1 12.
81.
KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 9.
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vote tallies and could move up the list to be awarded a seat if they
received sufficient individual votes.8 2 This incentivized candidates to
be more responsive to constituents' interests than political parties'
interests. Candidates could also run as individuals unaffiliated with
a party list.83 As a result, the open-list system, which Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani strongly supported,8 4 significantly enhanced
the democratic legitimacy of the elections as compared to the closedlist system utilized in the January and December 2005 elections.
The passage of the amendments to the Election Law was hailed
as a major accomplishment for the CoR. President Obama declared
the law "an important milestone" and congratulated Iraq's leaders for
reaching agreement on such a controversial issue.85 Prime Minister
al-Maliki called the Election Law a "historic victory of the will of the
people."86
The victory was short-lived. The CoR was required to submit the
approved amendments to the Presidency Council for ratification.87
On November 15, Vice President al-Hashimi sent CoR Speaker Ayad
al-Samarra'ie a letter requesting that the CoR return the percentage
of compensatory seats to 15 percent instead of the 5 percent allocated
by Article 1.88 Al-Hashimi argued that this increase would do "justice
to Iraqis residing abroad, especially those who were forcefully
displaced."89 He further argued that it was not equitable to decrease
the number of compensatory seats "at a time when the number of
those displaced abroad has doubled to more than four million
Al-Hashimi significantly
residents and displaced Iraqis."90
overstated the impact of the amendment on Iraqis living abroad, who
UNAMI estimated to be approximately two million in number.91 Of
these two million persons, only 368,000 voted in the December 2005

82.
Amendment of Election Law No. 16 of 2009, art. 3, sec. 3.
83.
Id. art. 3, sec. 1.
84.
Nimrod Raphaeli, The Test of Democracy in Iraq-Bargaining and
Compromise Over the Elections Law, AL WAREF INSTIT. (Jan. 5, 2010),
http://www.alwaref.org/en/component/content/article/35-opinions-and-analysis/196-thetest-of-democracy-in-iraq--bargaining-and-compromise-over-the-elections-law.
85.
Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Iraq Electoral Law Passes, Sets Up National Vote,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 8, 2009, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/
11/08/iraq-electoral-law-passes-n_350052.html.
86.
Id.
87.
See Raphaeli, supra note 84 ("Under the Iraqi constitution, laws approved
by parliament must be unanimously ratified by the Presidential Council, comprising
the President of the Republic and his two vice presidents.").
Letter from Tariq al-Hashemi, Vice President of Iraq, to Iraqi Parliament
88.
(Nov. 18, 2009) (on file with authors).
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
UNAMI, HUMANITARIAN BRIEFING ON THE CRISIS IN IRAQ 3 (2007),
91.
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/UN-Iraq%2OHumanitarian%20Briefing%2OFact%20
Sheet%20May%2007.pdf.
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election. 92 Most of the Iraqis displaced outside the country since 2003
were thought to be Sunni, and al-Hashimi's objection was intended to
curry favor with Sunni voters and increase the number of projected
Sunni seats in Parliament.9 3
Vice President al-Hashimi's letter was discussed at Parliament
on the following day, but no action was taken. 94 There was some
debate as to whether the letter had any legal effect, because it did not
explicitly "veto" the approved amendment; instead, the letter only
recommended that Article 1 of the amendment be changed.9 5 The
CoR ultimately determined that the form of al-Hashimi's letter was
Article 138(5) of the Constitution states that
immaterial. 96
legislation passed by the CoR must be forwarded to the Presidency
Council for "their unanimous approval and for its issuance within ten
days from the date of delivery to the Presidency Council."9 7
Accordingly, al-Hashimi could effectively veto the legislation by not
joining the other two members of the Presidency Council in
unanimously approving it.98 Rather than delve into the technical
aspects of the veto letter, Iraqi politicians pragmatically focused on
achieving consensus on an amended election law in order to avoid a
delayed election.
The CoR, however, did not immediately return to the legislative
drawing board. On November 18, the CoR petitioned the FSC for
review of whether the "reasons upon which [al-Hashimi] based his
abstinence to the first amendment for the election law #16 for the
In an opinion rendered the
year 2005" were constitutional.9
following day, the FSC carefully addressed the most general reading

92.
RHODA MARGESSON ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33936, IRAQI
REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: A DEEPENING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS?
(2009); U.N. Secretary-General, supranote 31, 12; Abdul-Rahma, supra note 79, at 5.
Iraq VP Vetoes Election Law, BBC NEWS, Nov. 18, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
93.
2/hilmiddleeast8365801.stm.
94.
Id.
95.
Hoda al-Jasim, Q&A with Iraqi VP Tarik al-Hashimi, ASHARQ ALAWSAT,
Dec. 12, 2009, http://www.aawsat.comlenglishi/news.asp?section=3&id=19152.
Article 138, Section 5, Doustour Joumbouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
96.
Id.
97.
Had the CoR chosen to bring a technical challenge to Hashimi's veto letter,
98.
the Court would have been presented with an opportunity to clarify the form that
approval of legislation must take under Section 5 of Article 138. Although the text of
the article could be read to create a requirement that the Presidency Council actively
approve (or veto) legislation within ten days of delivery, it could also be interpreted to
mean that legislation is deemed approved at the expiration of the ten-day period if the
Presidency Council does not indicate a contrary intent. In practice, the Council has
actively approved a small percentage of laws, and those not actively approved or vetoed
have been deemed approved at the end of the ten-day period.
99.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 72/federal/2009 of
November 19, 2009, availableat http://www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/fsc-opinion-72of-2009.pdf.
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of the question posed to it. 00 In brief and obscure language, the
Court stated that the Iraqi Constitution:
[D]id not differentiate between the Iraqis living inside Iraq or outside
it. It requires that the choice of the members of the Council should be
based on representing all the different constituents of the Iraqi people,
their election is done by public secret ballot and that at least one fourth
101
of them should be women.

The FSC further stated that "the election system is the responsibility
102
of the Independent High Commission for Elections."
This simple opinion lent legitimacy to al-Hashimi's threatened
veto. The Constitution does not restrict the bases upon which the
Presidency Council may veto legislation. 0 3 If the CoR expected the
FSC to expound on the limits of the veto power or to assess the
constitutionality of Article 1 of the amendments, it was disappointed.
By referencing the Article 49(1) requirement that Parliament
represent the entire Iraqi people, the FSC rendered a carefully
limited view of the question posed: the Presidency Council is not
required to approve legislation it deems subject to constitutional
defect. The opinion did .not expand into the larger question of
whether the Article 1 process for determining the number and
distribution of CoR seats comported with Article 49(1) of the
Constitution. In an example of judicial restraint, the Court instead
limited itself to reiterating the requirements of Article 49(1) and
104
pointing to IHEC's role in the electoral process.

C. Overcoming the Veto Challenge
The Iraqi government faced a political and constitutional crisis,
with the possibility of a second veto still looming. On a political level,
the veto destroyed a carefully crafted compromise and forced each
party to revaluate its position and second-guess the deal that had
been struck. The Kurds, for example, renewed their initial opposition
to the provincial seat distribution, which provided only three
additional seats to the Kurd provinces. 05 The Kurdistan Parliament
asked President Talabani to veto the legislation and to urge the CoR
06
to increase the number of compensatory seats to 18 percent.1

Id. Two conceivable readings of the CoR's question could be: "Is al100.
Hashimi's opposition to Article 1 on constitutional grounds unfounded?" and "May alHashimi veto legislation he believes is unconstitutional?" The Federal Supreme Court
addresses the latter formulation.
Id. (emphasis added).
101.
Id.
102.
Article 49, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
103.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 72/federal/2009.
104.
Iraq VP Vetoes Election Law, supra note 93.
105.
Id.
106.
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The veto also jeopardized IHEC's ability to hold the elections by
the deadline mandated in the Constitution: "forty-five days before the
conclusion of the preceding electoral term."10 7 Initially, there was
some confusion as to when the CoR's electoral term expired. The
Constitution states that the CoR's electoral term is "four calendar
years, starting with its first session."10 8 The outgoing CoR met for
the first time on March 16, 2006, to take the constitutional oath.109 It
immediately suspended proceedings until April 22, when it finally
agreed on who to elect as CoR Speaker, a task that the Constitution
required to occur during the "first session."1 10 Accordingly, it was
unclear whether the CoR's first session was March 16 (the day it first
convened) or April 22 (the date on which it performed its first session
duties). In May 2009, CoR Speaker Samarra'ie asked the FSC to
clarify when the CoR's electoral term ended, and he stated his opinion
that the March 16 CoR meeting was the "opening session" rather
The FSC ruled that the electoral term
than the "first session."'
started with the "first meeting of the CoR under the presidency of its
oldest member," which had occurred on March 16, 2006.112 The
current CoR's electoral term thus expired on March 15, 2010,
meaning that elections were required to be held prior to January 30,
2010.113

Iraqi leaders expressed concern about the constitutional
implications of al-Hashimi's veto.' 14 President Talabani stated that
although he had concerns with the Election Law, he and Vice
President al-Mahdi endorsed it in order to avoid a crisis: "If the
elections [were] postponed without a decision from parliament, there
[would] be a constitutional vacuum in Iraq. The presidency, the
prime ministry, and the parliament [would] lose their legitimacy." 15

Article 56, Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005. Moreover, by
107.
statute, the date of the elections has to be announced by presidential decree sixty days
before the date of holding the elections. Election Law of 2005, art. 5 (entered into the
Iraqi Official Gazette in September 2005).
Article 56, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
108.
AI-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 29/Federal/2009 of May
109.
13, 2009, available at http://www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/fsc-next-elections.doe; see
also New Parliament Adjourns, Can't Agree on Speaker, NPR, Mar. 16, 2006,
(discussing the new
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5283931
Parliament's first meeting).
Article 55, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
110.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 29/Federal/2009.
111.
112.
Id.
113.
Id.
The U.S. media also picked up on the implications of holding an election
114.
after the deadline mandated by the Constitution. See Iraq Fails to Resolve Vote Issue,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2009, at A14 (noting that breaching the deadline could set a
"dangerous precedent" that might be exploited).
Al Arabiya TV Interview with Vice President Tariq Al-Hashimi (Nov. 20,
115.
2006) [hereinafter Al-Hashimi Interview], available at http://www.linktv.org/scripts/
2
episodetranscript.php?episode=mosaic 0091118 (providing an English translation).
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As a result of al-Hashimi's veto, IHEC suspended all preparatory
work for the election. 11 6
The CoR reopened deliberations and passed a second amendment
to the text on November 23, following a week of intense
negotiations.' 17 The new amendment stated that the number of
parliamentary seats would be determined by MoT population
statistics from 2005, increased for all governorates by 2.8 percent
The amendment
annually to account for population growth."18
preserved the number of compensatory seats at 5 percent.1 19 It
stated, however, that the eight minority seats would be taken from
the seats allocated to governorates with substantial minority
populations (Baghdad, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Erbil, and Dohuk), meaning
that all fifteen compensatory seats could be distributed to the
national lists.120 Lastly, the amendment stated, "Iraqis, regardless of
their location, shall vote for the lists of their governorates or
This amendment placed out-of-country voters on
candidates."121
resident Iraqis by granting them a voice in election
footing
with
equal
outcomes for their home provinces; previously, out-of-country votes
were simply added to the national total and used to determine the
number of compensatory seats awarded to the national listS.122 The
amendment did not, however, increase provincial seat allocations on
the basis of anticipated out-of-country-voter returns, thus diluting
representation in provinces with significant numbers of out-ofcountry voters.
The bill was sent to the Presidency Council on November 25,
triggering the ten-day window for the Presidency Council's
The CoR's amendment did not fully address alapproval.123
124
Hashimi's concerns, and he indicated that he would again veto it.

116.
117.

Dawisha, supra note 38, at 32.
Amendment of Election Law No. 16 of 2009.

118.

Id. art. 1.

119.
Id.
120.
Id.
Id. art. 1, sec. 2.; see also id. art. 4, sec. 5 (giving IHEC the power to develop
121.
instructions for out-of-country voting).
122.
Id. art. 7.
Article 138, Section 5, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005. The FSC was
123.
then asked to determine when the ten-day period expired, given that the tenth
calendar day fell on Eid. The FSC noted that Section 5 of Article 138 did not qualify the
term "days," but stated that the Court should be guided by Civil Procedure Code 83 of
1969, which provides that "in case the period ends during an official holiday, it is
extended to the following working day." Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision
No. 76/Federal/2009 of December 3, 2009, available at http://www.gjpi.org/2009/12/03/
FSC
The
federal-supreme-court-opinion-on-timescale-for-presidency-council-veto.
concluded that the period for approving the legislation ended on December 6, as
December 4 (the tenth calendar day) was an official holiday, and December 5 fell on a
weekend. Id.
Joel Wing, VP Hashemi Shoots Himself in the Foot with Veto of Iraqi
124.
Election Law, EDUC. FOR PEACE IN IRAQ CTR. (Nov. 29, 2009), http://www.epic-
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In light of al-Hashimi's veto threat, Speaker Samarra'ie called the
CoR to meet in an extraordinary session to again examine the
amendments.1 25 After two failed attempts, the CoR finally reached a
quorum on December 6 at 11:30 p.m., thirty minutes before the tenday window for approval was to close. 126 At this point, it was clear
that the parties had reached a political compromise that would
prevent al-Hashimi from again vetoing the amendment.
At 11:49 p.m., the CoR passed a "decision" with an embedded
"Clarification Memo" that detailed the distribution of the
parliamentary seats. 12 7 Based on the 2005 MoT official population
statistics and an annual growth rate of 2.8 percent, the CoR would be
composed of 325 seats.128 Three hundred and ten seats would be
distributed to governorates based on MoT ration card data, and the
remaining fifteen seats were designated as compensatory seats to be
awarded to national lists based on their percentages of the vote. 129
The memo also clarified the number of seats allotted to each province
based on these statistics.13 0 The Presidency Council unanimously
approved the law on December 9, 2010.131 IHEC announced that the
elections would take place on March 7, 2010, over a month after the
date the FSC had determined they must occur.1 3 2

usa.org/2009/11/29/vp-hashemi-shoots-himself-in-the-foot-with-veto-of-iraqi-electionlaw.
125.
The Constitution authorizes the Prime Minister, the President, or the
Speaker to call an extraordinary session to discuss a specific matter. Article 58,
Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
126.
See KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 9 (noting that the new law passed just as
the deadline was about to lapse).
127.
Clarification Memorandum to Election Law No. 16 of 2005, available at
http://www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/cor-clarification-memo-eng.pdf.
It is unclear
why the CoR decided to frame this as a "decision" rather than "legislation." Pursuant to
Article 138, Section 5 of the Constitution, the Presidency Council must unanimously
approve both "decisions" and "legislation." However, one explanation might be that the
CoR determined that it needed a vehicle through which to amend the existing
legislation before the Presidency Council. Because there was no clear mechanism for it
to "take back" the amended law that it had submitted to the Presidency Council and it
did not wish to submit superseding amended legislation and thus restart the ten-day
approval window, a "decision" allowed the CoR, to re-amend, in effect, the existing
amended text by clarifying its terms and the intent of the drafters.
128.
Areej Al-Musttaf, UNDP Supports Iraqis in Electing Their Future
Government, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME NEWSROOM (Mar. 4, 2010), http://content.undp.org/
go/newsroom/2010/march/undp-supports-iraqis-in-electing-their-future-government.en.
129.
Amendment of Election Law No. 16 of 2009.
130.
Id.
131.
Presidency
Council
Decree
No.
20 of
2009,
available at
http://www.uniraq.org/documents/ElectoralMaterial/020310/Presidential%2Decree%2
Oon%2OAmendmentsUnofficial%20UNAMI%20TranslationEN.pdf. Although there is
some debate as to the legal requirement for the Presidency Council to issue an express
approval of legislation, as a practical matter, the Presidency Council rarely does so. As
a political matter, however, the Presidency Council's decree was a clear signal of its
desire that preparations for the coming elections continue without further delay.
132.
Al-Musttaf, supra note 128.
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III. THE DE-BA'ATHIFICATION FIAsco
U.S. and UN officials were relieved to see the amendment
controversy resolved. The election drama, however, had only just
begun. As the elections approached, Shia politicians lashed out
against suspected former (predominately Sunni) Ba'ath party
members, including parliamentary candidates, in an attempt to win
over the Shia base. Prime Minister al-Maliki-who had successfully
crossed the sectarian divide in the 2009 provincial elections by
focusing on improved security-similarly blamed Ba'athists for a
number of recent bombings that undermined his national security
platform.13 3 More ominously, Shia politicians took advantage of deBa'athification laws, first established by the CPA, to seek
disqualification of prominent Sunni candidates. The ensuing legal
struggles proved to be the greatest challenge yet for Iraq's fragile
democracy and threatened to derail the elections and return the
country to sectarian warfare.
A. Brief History of De-Ba'athification
The Ba'ath party was founded by Michel Aflaq and Slah al-Bitar
134
in 1940 and embraced a secular, nationalist, pan-Arab ideology.
The Ba'athists first seized power in Iraq in 1963, but they were
deposed shortly after. 3 5 In 1968, they returned to power in a mostly
bloodless coup.1 36 Saddam Hussein became President in 1979, after
forcing the resignation of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a former
ally.' 37
Saddam used party membership to maintain complete control
over the government. The Ba'ath party became a "countrywide
organization, reaching down to the smallest village and most modest
neighborhood in an unprecedented way."138 A majority of lower level
members joined solely out of necessity, as membership in the Ba'ath
party was a prerequisite for obtaining mid-level to high-level
government jobs.13 9

133.
Marc Santora & Abeer Mohammed, After Blasts, Iraqi Officials Point
Fingers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at A8.
Sylvia G. Haim, The Ba'ath in Syria, in PEOPLE AND POLITICS IN THE
134.
MIDDLE EAST 132, 132 (Michael Curtis ed., 1971).
See WILLIAM R. POLK, UNDERSTANDING IRAQ 114-15 (2005) (detailing the
135.
history of the Ba'athists rise to power); TRIPP, supra note 16, 164-69 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing the Ba'athists seizure of power).
TRIPP, supra note 16, at 184-85.
136.
137.
Id. at 213.
138.
Id. at 217-18.
See MIRANDA SIssoN, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., BRIEFING PAPER:
139.
IRAQ'S NEW "ACCOUNTABILITY AND JUSTICE" LAW 4 (2008) (noting that Ba'ath party
membership was reportedly a condition of employment in certain professions).
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Purging Ba'ath party officials became a top priority for the CPA.
In its first two weeks, the CPA issued two orders that had profound
consequences for Iraqi society. CPA Order 1, promulgated on May 16,
2003, dismissed from public service former Ba'ath members who held
the rank of Udw Firqah (group member) and above. 140 CPA Order 2,
issued a few days later, dissolved the Iraqi Army, intelligence
services, and even the Olympic Committee. 14 1
To help implement these orders, the CPA created an Iraqi DeBa'athification Council (IDC).142 Members of the IDC were selected
by the CPA Administrator and were responsible for investigating the
location of Ba'ath party property, the identity and whereabouts of
Ba'ath party officials and members allegedly involved in human
rights violations, details of criminal allegations against Ba'ath party
members, and "any other information relevant to" CPA Orders 1 and
2.143 The IDC was also charged with advising the CPA on means of
eliminating the Ba'ath party structure in Iraq, classifying Ba'ath
party officials, and reclaiming Ba'ath party assets.144
The de-Ba'athification process "quickly slipped out of control of
the CPA."14 5 In addition to the CPA-mandated IDC, the Iraqi
Governing Council established its own committee, called the Higher
National De-Ba'athification Commission (HNDBC).1 46 The HNDBC
was headed by Ahmed Chalabi, a controversial figure in both
American and Iraqi politics. 147 Chalabi lived most of his life in exile
in the United Kingdom and the United States, where he earned
degrees from MIT and the University of Chicago.14 8 After a
successful career in banking, he became leader of the Iraqi National
140.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 1, De-Ba'athification of Iraqi
Society, sec. 1, cl. 2, Doc. No. CPA/ORD/16 May 03/01 (May 16, 2003). CPA
Administrator Bremer retained authority, however, to "grant exceptions ... on a caseby-case basis." Id. sec. 1, cl. 6. CPA Memorandum 1 implemented the Order and set
forth the process by which U.S. forces would identify Ba'ath party members. Coalition
Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 7, Delegation of Authority Under DeBa'athification Order No. 1, sec. 1, Doc. No. CPAIMEM/3 June 03/01 (Nov. 4, 2003).
141.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 2, Dissolution of Entities, Annex,
Doc. No. CPA/ORD/23 May 03/02 (Aug. 23, 2003).
142.
Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 5, Establishment of the Iraqi DeBa'athification Council, sec. 1, cl. 1, Doc. No. CPA/ORD/25 May 03/05 (May 25, 2003).
143.
Id. sec. 3, cl. 1.
144.
Id. sec. 3, cl. 2(a)-(c)
145.
Eric Stover et al., Justice on Hold: Accountability and Social Reconstruction
in Iraq, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 5, 21 (2008).
146.
Id. In November 2003, "[r]ecognizing that organizing and expediting deBaathification is an urgent task that is necessary to put Iraq on the path towards
reconstruction and renewal," Bremer delegated authority to implement CPA Orders 1
and 2 to the IGC. He also stated that the IGC was authorized to further delegate that
authority to the HNDBC. Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 7, supra
note 140, sec. 1.
147.
See generally ARAM ROSTON, THE MAN WHO PUSHED AMERICA TO WAR
(2008), at xiii ("Some revere [Chalabi], some despise him, and some fear him.").
148.
Id. at 16, 18.
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Congress, the main Iraqi opposition group to the Ba'ath party. 149 In
the run-up to the invasion, Chalabi provided the Bush
Administration with purported evidence of Saddam's weapons of
mass destruction. 50 The Pentagon later realized that this evidence
was fabricated, and Chalabi fell out of favor with the U.S.
Administration.151
Chalabi revitalized his political career by
championing the de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society and allying
himself with Iran and religious Shia groups.1 52
The CPA's de-Ba'athification agenda had fateful consequences
for Iraq and was widely criticized as contributing to the rise of the
insurgency.1 5 3 The CPA's orders put approximately 300,000 armed
men out of work, eliminated thousands of ex-officers' pensions, and
purged the dilapidated ministries of roughly 30,000 employees,
including the most experienced technocrats and administrators.1 54
Iraqi soldiers, forced to find work in a country with 40 percent
unemployment, soon became disenchanted with the American-led
government.15 5 De-Ba'athification also had a profound effect on the
education system, as thousands of teachers were dismissed. In some
Sunni-dominated areas, "entire schools were left with just one or two
teachers."156
Acknowledging that the de-Ba'athification laws had been applied
"unevenly and unjustly,"' 5 7 Bremer subsequently eliminated the Iraqi
De-Ba'athification Council.15 8 The TAL, however, preserved the
HNDBC: "The establishment of national commissions such as ... the
Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission is confirmed. . . . The

members of these national commissions shall continue to serve after
this Law has gone into effect."159 The HNDBC thus continued its

149.
Id. at 89, 102.
150.
Romesh Ratnesar, From Friend to Foe, TIME, May 31, 2004, at 28.
151.
Id.
152.
Tim Arango, Early Backer of War Has Power Within His Grasp, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 2010, at A6.
153.
SISSON, supranote 139, at 5.
154.
TRIPP, supranote 16, at 282.
155.
See RAJIv CHANDRASEKARAN, IMPERIAL LIFE IN THE EMERALD CITY 265
(2006) (describing how thousands of dismissed soldiers gathered to protest Bremer's
decision, and noting the opposition to the CPA's policy, both within the American
government and the Iraqi public).
156.
Id. at 73.
157.
Sharon Otterman, IRAQ: Debanthification, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Apr. 7, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/publication/7853/iraq.html.
158.
Coalition Provisional Order No. 100, Transition of Laws, Regulations,
Orders, and Directives Issued by Coalition Provisional Authority, sec. 4, cl. 2, Doc. No.
CPA/ORD/27 June 04/100 (June 28, 2004); Coalition Provisional Authority
Memorandum No. 7, supra note 140, sec. 3.
Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of
159.
2004, art. 4(A).
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work, despite concerns that it was engaging in "political witch-hunts"
and failing to provide due process to targeted individuals. 160
B. The Post-ConstitutionalLegal Framework
The 2005 Constitution permanently outlawed the Ba'ath party 61
and enshrined the de-Ba'athification process initiated by the CPA. 162
For example, Article 135 states that the "High Commission for DeBa'athification shall continue its functions as an independent
commission . . . attached

to

the

Council

of Representatives."1 63

Article 135 also mandates that "[a] nominee to the position[] of
President of the Republic . .. [and] the members of the Council of
Representatives . . . may not be subject to the provisions of De-

Ba'athification."1 64 This provision could arguably be read as stating
that the members of the CoR were immune from de-Ba'athification

laws. The drafters intended the provision, however, to serve as a
"continuing prohibition on an individual from holding one of those

public positions if that individual, as a former Ba'ath Party member,
fell within one of the categories outlined in the de-Ba'athification
provisions in Iraqi law."s6 5 The Election Law No. 16 of 2005 (as
amended) reinforces that candidates for the CoR "[m]ust not be
covered by the Deba'thification law." 166
In 2008, the Iraqi Parliament revised the de-Ba'athification laws
with the enactment of the Law of the Supreme National Commission
for Accountability and Justice (AJC Law).1 67 The law replaced the

160.
Deeks & Burton, supra note 21, at 26.
161.
Article 7 of the Constitution states that the "Saddamist Ba'ath in Iraq and
its symbols, under any name whatsoever, shall be prohibited. Such entities may not be
part of the political pluralism in Iraq. This shall be regulated by law." Article 7,
Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005. This provision was extremely controversial
during the 2005 drafting sessions. A July 22 draft prohibited both "thought and
practice relating the Ba'ath Party under Saddam Hussein." Deeks & Burton, supra
note 21, at 25. The final provision omitted this controversial clause due to concerns
expressed by Sunni negotiators and U.S. Government representatives. Id.
162.
According to commentators familiar with the constitutional drafting
negotiations,
The resulting final provisions [of the Constitution] responded in limited ways to
Sunni concerns that the de-Ba'athification program unfairly targeted Sunnis
whose ties to the Ba'ath Party had been superficial, if not non-existent, but
largely reinforced the Shia Alliance position that the government should
continue to pursue a robust de-Ba'athification of Iraqi society.
Deeks & Burton, supra note 21, at 25.
163.
Article 135, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
164.
Id. art. 135, sec. 3.
165.
Deeks & Burton, supra note 21, at 28.
166.
Election Law No. 16 of 2005, art. 6, sec. 2.
167.
Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice
No. 10 of 2008.
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HNDBC with the Supreme Commission for Accountability and
Justice (AJC).s68 The AJC is made up of "seven politically and legally
experienced members" who are nominated "through a proposal from
the Council of Ministers, a simple majority approval by the Council of
Representatives and ratification by the Presidency Council."' 69 The
AJC's purpose is to "[pirevent the return of the Ba'ath party to power
or to the public life in Iraq" and to "[c]leanse state institutions, mixed
sector institutions, civil society institutions and Iraqi society from any
shape or form of the Ba'ath party system."170 In order to accomplish
this mission, the AJC is authorized to "finalize the identification of
individuals included in the De-Ba'athification procedures within the
period of the Commission's work."' 71
Article 6 of the AJC Law sets forth the "De-Ba'athification
procedures," which provide different penalties and prohibitions for
former Ba'ath party members depending on their former rank in the
party. 7 2 Of relevance to the elections is Article 6(8), which states
that "[a]ny one who occupied the rank of [group] member [Udw
Firqah] and above in the Ba'ath party and enriched himself at the
expense of public funds shall not be allowed to hold special level posts
[including Member of Parliament]." 7 3 Individuals identified by the
AJC as subject to the de-Ba'athification procedures have a right of
appeal to a panel of the Court of Cassation within thirty days. 174
This panel, called the Cassation Chamber, has sixty days to rule on
the appeal, and its decisions are final.' 7 5

C. De-Ba'athificationCrisis
The AJC, headed by Ahmed Chalabi and Ali al-Lami, 7 6 started
disqualifying candidates shortly after the amendments to the Election

168.
Id. art. 2, sec. 1.
169.
Id. art. 2, sec. 4.
170.
Id. art. 3, secs. 1-2.
171.
Id. art. 4, sec. 5(a).
172.
Id. art. 6. The law also contained some provisions intended to reintegrate
low-level Ba'ath party officials. For example, it permitted members at the "member"
(Udw Firqa) level and below to return to their previous employment, so long as they
did not occupy certain special level posts in the new government. Id. art. 6, secs. 5-6. It
also provides pensions for dismissed employees at the shu'ba level and below, except
for members of the Feda'iyeen Saddam and anyone proven to have committed crimes
against the Iraqi people or gained wealth at the expense of public funds. Id. art. 6, secs.
1-4.
173.
Id. art. 6, sec. 8.
174.
Id. art. 15.
175.
Id. art. 17.
176.
Ali al-Lami's participation in the AJC led many to believe that the AJC's
decisions were politically motivated. Al-Lami had previously been detained by U.S.
forces for his suspected involvement in an attack against U.S. Embassy personnel. He
was also a candidate for Parliament. See Rod Nordland & Sam Dagher, Commander

Says U.S. Will Release More Members of an Iraqi Shiite Militia, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 18,
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Law were passed, casting new doubt on IHEC's ability to hold the
elections without substantial delays.
On January 7, the AJC
informed IHEC that it had disqualified 496 nominees from running in
the upcoming elections.' 77 It increased this number to 511 on
January 19.178 The barred candidates included both Shia and
Sunnis, but the AJC decision was widely perceived within Iraq-and
in
international
press
coverage-as
specifically
and
disproportionately targeting Sunnis.1 79 Significantly, among those
barred was a prominent Sunni politician, Saleh al-Mutlaq.18 0 AlMutlaq was admittedly a former member of the Ba'ath party, but he
was expelled in 1977 after demanding that a group of Shia charged
with plotting against the state be given a fair trial.'18 The AJC
decision to bar al-Mutlaq sparked outrage in Sunni communities,
which viewed it as a Shia plot to disenfranchise Sunni voters.182 AlMutlaq, however, stated that he would appeal the decision through
legal channels.1 83
The AJC subsequently reinstated fifty-nine
election candidates for technical reasons, such as mistaken identity,
but al-Mutlaq's disqualification stood.184
IHEC implemented the AJC decision and deleted the disqualified
names from the electoral lists, leading to a heated debate on the

2009, at A4 (discussing al-Lami's suspected involvement with the bombing and his
proposed release).
177.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph6 of Resolution 1883 (2009), 7, U.N. Doc. S/2010/76 (May 14, 2010); Nada
Bakri & Anthony Shadid, Move Made to Bar Iraqi from Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2010, at A4.
178.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 177, T 7.
179.
See Interview by Greg Bruno, Staff Writer, Council on Foreign Relations,
with Reidar Visser, Research Fellow, Nor. Inst. of Int'l Affairs (Jan. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/21305/avoidingcrisisin iraqsjolitical
minefield.html (stating that the barred candidates include Shia, but the "largest single
group ... would be the secular nationalists").
180.
Nada Bakri, The Rise and Fall of a Sunni in Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2010, at A4.
181.
Id. Mutlaq was later named to the constitution drafting committee-he
voted against the final draft, objecting to the provision that outlawed the Ba'ath Party.
Id.
182.
Ranj Alaaldin, Ba'ath Saga Haunts Iraq'sFuture, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 13,
2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/13/baath-iraq-debaathificationelections ("It is no surprise that Sunni officials consider this another plot by the Shiadominated government to outmaneuver and marginalize the Sunnis, who this time round
are expected to come out and vote en masse."). U.S. officials were also concerned that the
disqualifications could reignite sectarian violence and jeopardize the self-imposed
August 30 deadline for withdrawing U.S. combat troops. KATZMAN, supra note 12, at
11-12.
183.
Bakri & Shadid, supra note 177, at A4. Mutlaq stated: "Banning us lacks
credibility, is illegal and is wrong. Iraqis will not accept this. We will not give up, and
we will appeal." Id.

184.
Iraq Reinstates 59 Election Candidates, AGtNCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 25,
2010, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJGz55dJrn
OzzejqmBj6QTolyydg.
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legitimacy of AJC decisions.18 5 The Shia parties (INA and SOL)
supported the AJC, while Sunni parties declared that the AJC was
corrupt and illegitimate. 186 Al-Maliki, who had previously attempted
to appeal to Sunni voters, was forced to support the AJC in the run
up to the elections or jeopardize losing his Shia base.18 7
The debate focused on whether the Commission had authority to
implement the de-Ba'athification laws. 8 8 As noted above, the 2008
AJC Law established the Commission and set forth the process for
appointing the commissioners.1 89 Specifically, the statute stated that
the seven commissioners must be proposed by the CoM, and their
nominations must be approved by a simple majority of the CoR and
ratified by the Presidency Council.190 As of 2009, neither Chalabi nor
al-Lami, the sole AJC commissioners, had been approved by the COR,
and they arguably lacked statutory authority to implement the AJC
Law.' 9 ' Observers were also concerned by the lack of transparency in
the AJC's decision making.' 92 Candidates were not notified of the
charges against them and were not given the opportunity to rebut the
evidence that the AJC relied on.19 3
As tensions mounted, a number of senior government officials
publicly registered their concerns and put the AJC on notice that the
legitimacy of its activities was in question. On January 17, 2010, the
General Secretariat of the CoM sent a letter informing the AJC of the
illegality of its actions: "Due to disapproval of the Council of

Anthony Shadid, Iraqi Commission Bars Nearly 500 Candidates from
185.
ParliamentaryElection, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at A4 ("Western officials and some
Iraqi politicians have questioned whether the decisions by the Accountability and
Justice Commission are even binding, and critics have accused its director, Ali Faisal
al-Lami, of carrying out agendas of various Iraqi politicians and of Iran.").
Nada Bakri, Move to Bar Candidacy Stirs Iraqis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010,
186.
at A6.
As Professor Hamoudi noted, "[Al-Maliki is] not scared of Mutlaq, he's
187.
scared of looking like a friend of Mutlaq, which would be electoral disaster for him."
Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Real Electoral Crisis in Iraq, ISLAMIC LAW IN OUR TIMES (Jan.
23, 2010), http://muslimlawprof.org/2010/01/23/the-real-electoral-crisis-in-iraq.aspx.
188.
Shadid, supra note 185, at A4 ("[S]ome Iraqi politicians have questioned
whether the decisions by the Accountability and Justice Commission are even binding,
and critics have accused the director, Al Faisal al-Lami, of carrying out agendas of
various politicians and of Iran.").
189.
See supra Part III.B (discussing the 2008 revision of the de-Ba'athification
laws).
190.
Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice
No. 10 of 2008, art. 2, sec. 4.
191.
Edward Hameed, Talabani Asks Federal Supreme Court to Ascertain
Commission's Legitimacy, AL-SHORFA, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.al-shorfa.com/
cocoonlmeiilxhtml/enGB/features/meiilfeatures/main/2010/01/22/feature-01.
192.
Reidar Visser, Blacklisted in Baghdad, FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 27, 2010,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65939/reidar-visser/blacklisted-in-baghdad?page
=show.
Iraq: Candidate Ban Jeopardizes Election, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 26,
193.
2010), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/01/26/iraq-candidate-ban-jeopardizes-election.
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Ministers' decision no. 385 for the year 2009 proposing the
establishment of the [AJC], we would like to inform you that the
action taken by the formed Commission . .. is illegal." 194 President
Talabani also voiced displeasure with the AJC: "[W]e must respond to
it with legal measures by going through the Court of Cassation to
challenge the decision."1 95
In addition to calls for a general appeal challenging the AJC's
legitimacy, a number of disqualified candidates filed individual
appeals.1 96 In other cases, the political parties decided to replace
disqualified candidates with new nominees.1 97 On February 3, the
Cassation Chamber issued a decision on one of these appeals, through
which it took the opportunity to opine on the appeals process
generally. 98 The court explained that a ruling on appeals from AJC
decisions:
[R]equires first to examine the legal status of the entity who issues
them in the first place, also it [is] required to verify the evidence and
documents used as a foundation for including the relevant protestors
with the above mentioned procedures, furthermore, it is also required
199
to verify the protesters' proofs to nullify what they were accused of.

The court stated that it would not be able to complete such a
review prior to February 7, the start of the election campaign. 200 It
thus decided to "postpone deciding on this and the other submitted
appeals, and to allow the protestors to participate in the election as []
candidate[s] for the purpose of practicing their constitutional right for
the electoral term starting in 2010."201 The court further stated that
it would review the appeals of any winning candidate after the
election, and winning candidates would not be entitled to take a seat
in the CoR or enjoy the rights and privileges associated with CoR
membership until the Cassation Chamber decided those appeals. 202
The court's declaration that it did not have enough time to
review the appeals was unusual but prudent under the
The AJC had "delay[ed] the examination of
circumstances.
candidates' credentials until so late in the day, and disqualified too

Letter from Ali Muhsin Ismail, Acting Gen. Sec'y of Council of Ministers, to
194.
the Nat'l Commission for De-Ba'athification (Jan. 17, 2010) (on file with authors).
Hameed, supra note 191.
195.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 177, 7.
196.
Id.; see also Steven Lee Myers, Few Barred Candidates Are Restored to
197.
Iraqi Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010, at A19 (reporting that 171 disqualified
nominees appealed the AJC ruling).
Mahkamat al-Tamiez [Tamiez] [Court of Cassation] [Cassation], decision
198.
No. 108 of February 3, 2010, available at http://www.gjpi.org/2010/02/03/appeal-paneloverturns-election-ban-and-postpones-de-baathification-examination.
Id.
199.
Id.
200.
Id.
201.
Id.
202.
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many people for its decision not to appear excessive so close to the
elections."20 3 This put the Cassation Chamber in a difficult position.
On the one hand, the Constitution expressly prohibits nominees
covered by the de-Ba'athification laws from being nominated to the
CoR. 204 On the other hand, the AJC's decision on the eve of the
election made it exceedingly difficult for the court to thoroughly
examine the appeals without delaying the elections. A cursory review
of AJC decisions would violate the candidates' due process rights and
potentially deprive them of the constitutional right to "enjoy political
rights including the right to. . . run for office." 205 This compromise
"achieved a Pyrrhic victory that save[d] the elections, but only if its
writ [was] widely accepted by the country."206
The Pyrrhic victory, like so many before it, was short lived. Shia
political groups openly criticized the court's decision 20 7 and
threatened to seek legislative action. The SoL Coalition, for example,
issued the following statement:
We are astonished that the decision of the Appeals Commission that
was issued today did not carefully examine the issue of the disqualified
from the parliamentary elections. For even those whose hands are
stained with the bloods of Iraqis from the elements of Saddam's
Fedayeen benefited from it. The Commission should have at least
prevented the members of Saddam's Fedayeen and his intelligence
208
apparatus from taking part in the parliamentary elections.

As political pressure mounted, 209 the Cassation Chamber
reversed its decision to postpone review of the appeals until after the

203.
Chibli Mallat, A Solomonic Judgment on Elections in Iraq, JURIST (Feb. 8,
2010), http:/rist.law.pitt.edulforumy/2010/02/solomonic-judgment-on-elections-in-iraq.php.
204.
Article 135, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
205.
Id. art. 10.
206.
Mallat, supra note 203.
207.
The fact that the U.S. Government had previously urged the Cassation
Chamber to postpone ruling on the appeals might also have contributed to criticism
against the court. See Visser, supra note 192 (noting that Washington appears to favor
solving the crisis by postponing the de-Ba'athification process until after the elections).
Ali al-Lami, for example, declared that the Cassation Chamber's decision was a result
of U.S. pressure: "For the past two days I saw American embassy officials inside the
court and they clearly put pressure on the [judiciary]. This is the direct result of [U.S.
Vice President] Joe Biden." Marin Chulov, Iraqi Government Lifts 'Anti-Sunni' Ban on
Next Month's Election, GUARDIAN, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
feb/03/iraq-lifts-candidates-election-ban.
208.
Statement from the State of Law Coalition Regarding the Decision of the
Appeal Panel to Sanction the Participation of the Ba'athists (on file with authors).
209.
Letter from 240 Iraqi Lawyers, to the President of the Iraqi Supreme
Judicial Council Medhat al-Mahmoud (Feb. 13, 2010) (on file with authors) (stating
that "during the past few days we saw a noticeable increase in the political pressure on
the appeal commission in hysterical way," and urging the Chief Justice to "take a stand
against this blatant intervention" in the independence of the judiciary); see also Myers,
supra note 197, at A19 ("[Clonsiderable political pressure has been brought to bear on
[the Cassation Chamber's] members as they tried to navigate the utter legal chaos that
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election. On February 7, Speaker al-Samarra'ie announced that "an
agreement was reached between legal advisers to the parliament and
the [Cassation Chamber] about the possibility of completing all the
files before the electoral campaigns on February 12."210 He also
called on the AJC to "accelerate the submission of all documentation
in its possession." 2 11
Several days later, the Cassation Chamber issued a decision that
resolved the underlying doubts about the AJC's legitimacy. 212 The
court noted that the AJC Law of 2008 changed the name of the High
National Committee for De-Ba'athification to the Supreme National
Commission for Accountability and Justice and provided that the
commissioners should be nominated by the CoM and approved by a
majority of the CoR. 213 The court stated, however, that the law did
not clearly dissolve the HNDBC. 214 Accordingly, the court held that
the commissioners were authorized to continue their functions as "a
regular care taker committee" and that the work of the committee
"acquired legitimacy based on the above mentioned reasons." 215 The
court then proceeded to review the merits of individual appeals and
ultimately reinstated twenty-six of the candidates disqualified by the
AJC.216
The Cassation Chamber's reversal of its decision to postpone
review was generally perceived as a sign that the judiciary was
susceptible to political pressure.2 1 7 This may not adequately explain
the court's reasoning. The court's initial decision to postpone review
of the disqualified candidates was largely attributed to the AJC's
reticence to provide the files on the disqualified candidates. 2 18 The
court's threat to reinstate the disqualified candidates pending the

is the Iraqi de-Baathification process." (quoting Reidar Visser, Norwegian Inst. of
International Affairs) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
210.
Iraq in Statement of Appeals Commission, AKNEws, Feb. 8, 2010,
http://www.aknews.com/enlaknews/4/112321.
211.
Id.
212.
See Tamiez Court of Cassation, decision No. 225 of February 11, 2010
(translation on file with authors) (applying Accountability and Justice Law No. 10 of
2008 to identify and bar former Ba'ath party members).
213.
Id.
Id.
214.
215.
Id.
KATZMAN, supra note 12, at 11.
216.
See, e.g., Dawisha, supra note 38, at 39 ("Another worrisome problem is the
217.
continued ability of the executive to sway the opinions and judgments of the supposedly
'independent' judiciary."); Ranj Alaaldin, Iraq's Troubled Elections, GUARDIAN, Feb. 15,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/feb/15/iraq-elections-baath-ban
2010,
(noting that the Cassation Chamber's decision "was made after judges, as a result of an
outcry among the great and powerful of Iraq's political actors, reversed their earlier,
U.S.-sponsored decision to postpone the appeals process until after the elections").
218.
See Iraq's 2010 National Elections, HUM. RTs. WATCH (Feb. 25, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/node/88800 (noting that the Iraqi appeals court postponed all the
disqualifications since it did not have sufficient time to review the individual evidence).
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election may have been calculated to force the AJC to disclose the
information necessary for the court to conduct its review. Once the
AJC provided this information and IHEC agreed to postpone the start
of the election campaign period, 219 the court had a legitimate reason
to reconsider its initial decision. Furthermore, the court may have
been understandably inclined to help defuse a potentially explosive
situation.
The court's ultimate holding was legally defensible, especially
when viewed in context.220 Article 135 of the Constitution states that
the "High Commission for De-Ba'athification shall continue its
functions as an independent commission" until dissolved by the CoR
"by an absolute majority after the completion of its functions." 2 21
This constitutional mandate gave the Cassation Chamber a
legitimate basis to determine that the AJC was authorized to
continue its duties absent a clear decision by the CoR to dissolve it.
The court was also understandably reluctant to hold that the
AJC lacked authority due to the CoR's failure to confirm the
commissioners. The CoR similarly failed to fulfill its constitutional
obligation to pass a law to govern the selection, qualifications, and
work of the FSC. 222 It likewise failed to ratify the judges of the
Cassation Chamber, as required by Article 2(9) of the AJC Law. 223
The Cassation Chamber's decision thus took into account the reality
that strict enforcement of procedural requirements was not pragmatic
under these circumstances and would potentially cast doubt on the
legitimacy of a number of other institutions, including the FSC.
The Cassation Chamber asserted its authority over the AJC, but
it did not slow down the AJC commissioners. The AJC proceeded to

IHEC agreed to postpone the beginning of the election campaign until
219.
February 12, giving the Cassation Chamber four extra days to finalize its review of the
appeals. See De-Baathification Saga Continues, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L
PEACE (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?
fa-view&id=24834.
220.
Critics of the decision could argue that the CoR intended to suspend the
Commission's work pending approval of new commissioners. Article 20 of the AJC Law
states: "Measures taken by the Commission prior to the date of coming into force of this
Law shall be considered valid as long as they comply with the provisions of the laws in
force when they were taken and do not violate the provisions of this law." Law of the
Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice No. 10 of 2008, art. 20.
By implication, this provision could be read to mean that all actions taken after the law
entered into force were invalid unless they were in accordance with the procedures set
forth in that law, including the requirement for CoR ratification of Commission
members.
221.
Article 135, Sections 1-2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
222.
The Constitution provides that the FSC "shall be made up of a number of
judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars, whose number, the method
of their selection, and the work of the Court shall be determined by a law enacted by a
two-thirds majority of the [CoR]." Id. art. 92, sec. 2.
Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and Justice
223.
No. 10 of 2008, art. 2, sec. 9.
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review the list of candidates who had been selected to replace many of
those disqualified in its January decision. 224 On March 3, it informed
IHEC that fifty-two of these candidates were also ineligible. 2 25 IHEC
ignored the AJC ruling and kept the names on the ballots.22 6
After the March 7 elections, discussed infra,227 the SoL Coalition
appealed IHEC's decision to the Electoral Judicial Panel (EJP), a
three-judge panel established to rule on appeals of IHEC decisions. 228
IHEC explained that it disregarded the AJC's disqualifications for
two reasons. First, the AJC disqualified candidates the day before
special needs voting was scheduled to begin. 229 This, IHEC
explained, was a "very critical period as IHEC had already prepared
the candidates lists and organized the electronic system for data
entry, which would make it difficult to introduce any changes."2 30
Second, it would not be "fair to disregard votes for candidates whose
case concerning whether they are covered by the AJC procedures is
yet to be settled, especially since they have the right to appeal before
the Cassation Chamber." 231
The EJP ruled in favor of the SoL Coalition on April 26, holding
that "IHEC [was] not entitled to refuse to implement the decision
which ban[ned] candidates included in AJC decisions from
participating in the parliamentary elections."232 The panel explained
that "IHEC is an executive body with no jurisdiction to discuss
whether a candidate is included in the measures stipulated in [the
AJC] Law No. 10 of 2008."233 Moreover, the EJP explained that the
Cassation Chamber, not IHEC, was the entity authorized to review
AJC decisions. 2 34 The panel then ordered that the votes received by
the newly disqualified candidates would not be counted and that
those disqualified candidates who won a seat, according to
preliminary results, would not be entitled to membership in the
COR. 235 Finally, the EJP ordered that the affected candidates be
notified of the AJC decision in order "to enable them to challenge
these decisions" before the Cassation Chamber. 236 Those candidates

224.
Ammar Karim, Iraq Vote Panel Invalidates 52 Candidates, MIDDLE E.
ONLINE, Apr. 26, 2010, http://www.middle-east-online.com/englishl?id=38649.
225.
Id.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 6, 10.
226.
See infra Part IV (discussing the controversy surrounding certification of
227.
the election results and the EJP's decision to order a recount).
Law of the Independent High Commission No. 11 of 2007, art. 8, sec. 4.
228.
Electoral Judicial Panel, decision Nos. 38 and 39/47/Appeal/2010, April 26,
229.
2010 (translation on file with authors).
Id.
230.
Id.
231.
Id.
232.
233.
Id.
Id.
234.
235.
Id.
236.
Id.
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who successfully appealed their disqualification would have their
votes reinstated.
The decision added more uncertainty to the election certification
process, which will be discussed in greater depth infra.23 7 Iraqiyya
members criticized it: "We consider the decision [to disqualify fiftytwo candidates] a clear politicizing of the judiciary. It's impossible to
protect democracy without an independent judicial system."2 38 For
the first time, U.S. Embassy officials publicly expressed concern over
the delays in certifying the election results.2 39
The EJP decision further delayed certification of the election
results, but there is no evidence that it was driven by improper
political considerations. To the contrary, the EJP's decision carefully
balanced statutory authorities and individual rights. The EJP, an
administrative appeals court with limited jurisdiction, did not have
authority to review AJC decisions; its jurisdiction was limited by
Board of
of the IHEC
decisions
to reviewing
statute
Commissioners. 240 Similarly, the EJP correctly determined that the
Cassation Chamber, not IHEC, had exclusive jurisdiction to review
the merits of AJC decisions. IHEC thus acted improperly by ignoring
the decision of another executive body that had authority (as
determined by the Cassation Chamber 24 1) to issue such decisions.
The underlying problem in this case was poor statutory drafting, not
corruption of the judiciary. The AJC Law, which was enacted after
242
the IHEC Law, required IHEC to implement the AJC's decisions,
but neither the AJC Law nor the Election Law imposed a deadline for
the AJC to act prior to the elections. Thus, as IHEC noted in its
argument to the EJP, 24 3 candidates who were disqualified
immediately prior to the election would suffer an irreparable injury if
they were stricken from the ballot without having an opportunity to
have their appeals heard by the Cassation Chamber.
The EJP addressed this concern by ordering that the affected
candidates be informed of the AJC decision and given the opportunity

237.
See infra Part IV.
Jane Arraf & Mohammed al-Dulaimy, US Expresses First Concerns over
238.
2010,
26,
Apr.
MONITOR,
SCl.
CHRISTIAN
Results,
Iraq
Elections
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0426[US-expresses-first-concernsover-Iraq-election-results.
Ambassador Christopher Hill stated, "We have an election that took place
239.
on March 7. We are now approaching the two-month period and we are concerned that
the process is lagging." Id.
Law of the Independent High Commission No. 11 of 2007, art. 8.
240.
241.
Id.
See Law of the Supreme National Commission for Accountability and
242.
Justice No. 10 of 2008, art. 13, sec. 1 ("[I]ndependent bodies ... shall be obliged to
implement the decisions and instructions of the Commission.").
Electoral Judicial Panel, decision Nos. 38 and 39/47/Appeal/2010, April 26,
243.
2010.
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to appeal to the appropriate forum, the Cassation Chamber. 244 Those
candidates who succeeded in their appeal would have their votes
reinstated, thereby avoiding an irreparable harm. 24 5 The EJP was
thus able to reach a decision that respected the statutory framework
that limited IHEC's authority and that, at the same time, upheld the
due process rights of the affected candidates.
An AJC attempt to disqualify eight CoR nominees after the
election posed another challenge for the judiciary. On April 4, the
AJC informed IHEC that it had disqualified six candidates who had
been elected in the March 7 elections. 246 On April 7, IHEC responded
that the "amended Electoral Law no. 16 of 2005 authorized the
Electoral Commission to review the competency of candidates instead
of election winners (i.e., elected candidates)." 247 IHEC added that the
CoR is the only body that has the "authority to review the competency
of the winners." 248 IHEC concluded that the AJC's decision should be
considered as an appeal against the election results and referred to
the EJP, which has jurisdiction to review such challenges. 24 9 On May
3, the EJP stated that it had "temporarily stopped looking into [the
joint appeals] according to article (83/1) of the amended civil code
procedure (83) for 1969" until the Cassation Chamber decided the
appeals from the eight disqualified nominees.25 0
The Cassation Chamber ruled in favor of the disqualified
candidates. 251 The Chamber noted that two of the candidates had
been initially disqualified in January. 25 2 Their disqualifications had
been overturned by the Cassation Chamber, and they were thus
permitted to run in the elections. 253 The Chamber reiterated that its
previous ruling "according to Article 2(9) of Law No. 10 of 2008 [was]
considered a final decision . . . and [was] not subject to refute." 254 As

244.
Id.
245.
Id.
See, e.g. Tamiez Court of Cassation, decision No. 2231/Appeal
246.
Committee/2010 of May 16, 2010, Al-Nashra al Qadaiah (translation on file with
authors) (citing AJC memorandum); see also Hannah Allam, Iraq Election: Victorious
CandidatesMay Be Purged, Boosting Maliki, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 29, 2010,
http://www.csmonitor.coniWorld/Middle-East/2010/0329/Iraq-election-Victoriouscandidates-may-be-purged-boosting-Maliki.
Independent High Electoral Comm'n [IHEC], Secretariat of the Council of
247.
Comm'rs, Sec. of Comm'r Aff., No. SH.M/2/Regular 34, Apr. 7, 2010 (on file with
authors).
248.
Id.
Id.
249.
250.
Id.
Tamiez Court of Cassation, decision No. 2224/Appeal Committee/2010 of
251.
May 16, 2010, Al-Nashra al Qadaiah (translation on file with authors).
252.
Id.
Id.; Tamiez Court of Cassation, decision No. 2231/Appeal Committee/2010.
253.
The court should have cited to Article 17, which states that its decisions
254.
shall be "final and definitive." Law of the Supreme National Commission for
Accountability and Justice No. 10 of 2008, art. 17.
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to the other six disqualified candidates, the Cassation Chamber found
that the AJC lacked authority to disqualify candidates after the
elections.2 55 The court stressed that an "appellant's status should not
be on indefinite hold just for the sake of new evidence that might be
surfaced to include him in Law No. 10 of 2008, especially after
winning a seat in the election."256 In a stark rebuke to the AJC, the
court remarked that "the committee should conduct background
investigation on the candidate before the election date in accordance
with Article 6 of the [amended Election Law]. "257

IV.

ELECTIONS AND THE LONG ROAD TO CERTIFICATION

Rockets and mortars exploded across Baghdad even before
polling stations opened on the morning of March 7, as al-Qaeda
attempted to intimidate voters and disrupt the elections. 258 Voter
turnout was nevertheless strong.2 59 Approximately 12 million of 18.9
million eligible voters (62 percent) cast a ballot in the 49,630 official
polling stations across the country. 26 0 Ballots included eighty-six
political entities, twelve coalitions, and 6,292 candidates. 261
Thousands of international observers monitored polling stations and
262
unanimously applauded IHEC's administration of the election.
Preliminary reports released later that night revealed that alMaliki's SOL Coalition and Allawi's Iraqiyya were neck and neck,
causing a rare "election cliffhanger" in a region dominated by

Tamiez Court of Cassation, decision No. 2231/Appeal Committee/2010.
255.
256.
Id.
Id. Article 6 of the Election Law sets forth the qualifications for CoR
257.
candidates, one of which is that the candidate "must not be covered by the DeBa'athification law." Election Law No. 16 of 2005, art. 6, sec. 2.
Steven Lee Myers, Iraqis Defy Blasts in Strong Turnout for Pivotal Vote,
258.
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2010, at Al. There were forty documented explosions in Baghdad
alone. As one journalist noted, "the intensity of the barrage was reminiscent of the
worse days of bloodshed in 2006 and 2007, when Iraq teetered on the precipice of civil
war." Id.
"Special needs" voting for security forces, inmates, and invalids started a
259.
few days earlier, on March 4. U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 6, 5. Out-of-country
polling centers were also established in sixteen countries: Australia, Austria, Canada,
Denmark, Egypt, Germany, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Holland, Sweden, Syria, Turkey,
the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Electoral
Technical Assistance for Iraq for Out of Country Voting, INT'L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL
SYS. (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Papers/2010/ElectoralTechnical-Assistance-for-Iraq-for-Out-of-Country-Voting.aspx.
Dawisha, supra note 38, at 26-27, 35.
260.
Id. at 35. IHEC ultimately printed twenty-six million ballots, even though
261.
the total number of eligible voters approximated nineteen million, fueling subsequent
charges of fraud and corruption in the vote-tallying process. Id.
Id.; see also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text (discussing the election
262.
and its international observers).

366

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:331

authoritarian rule and rigged elections. 263 After additional reports
indicated that Iraqiyya had a two-seat lead, al-Maliki took to the
offensive, stating that his party had uncovered widespread fraud in
several provinces. 264 He demanded a countrywide recount in order to
"safeguard the political stability and to prevent the slipping of the
security situation in the country and the resurgence of violence."2 65
President Talabani supported the request for a recount to "preclude
any doubt and misunderstanding" about the results. 266 Iraqiyya
dismissed al-Maliki's demand for a recount and echoed international
observers' assurances that there was no evidence of widespread
fraud. 26 7
On March 21, the IHEC Board of Commissioners officially
rejected al-Maliki's request for lack of "justifying reasons." 26 8 IHEC's
Commissioner, Faraj Haidari-who had previously refrained from
entering the public debate-openly denounced al-Maliki's demand:
"To come now and make allegations against IHEC, I don't think this
serves the interests of that person, or the elections process, or even
political progress in its entirety." 269 On March 26, IHEC released the
official preliminary election results, which still required certification
by the FSC. 270 Iraqiyya won a plurality with ninety-one seats,
followed by SOL (eighty-nine seats), INA (seventy-one seats), 271 and
the Kurdish Alliance (forty seats).27 2
Al-Maliki appealed IHEC's decision to the EJP, while U.S.
officials urged Iraqi leaders to "refrain from inflammatory rhetoric or

263.
Myers, supra note 258, at Al.
264.
Ned Parker & Caesar Ahmed, Iraq Vote May Spark Turmoil, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2010, at Al.
265.
Id. Other SoL candidates warned that violence would escalate if the ballots
were not counted by hand. Poll Body Rejects Iraq Recount, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 22, 2010,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/03/2010321163545857542.html.
266.
Iraq President Calls for Election Recount, CBS NEWS, Mar. 21, 2010,
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/21/world/main6319989.shtml.
267.
See Jane Arraf, Iraq Election: Baghdad Recount Begins with a Hitch,
CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, May 3, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/MiddleEast/2010/0503/Iraq-election-Baghdad-recount-begins-with-a-hitch ("[The] US, the UN
and many other organizations which sent observers to the elections . . . all attested to
an election that was free of widespread systematic fraud." (quoting Gary Grappo,
former ambassador to Oman and current political counselor to the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
268.
Electoral Judicial Panel, decision No. 37/66Appeals/2010 of April 19, 2010
(translation on file with authors).
269.
Parker & Ahmed, supra note 264, at Al.
270.
Timothy Williams & Rod Nordland, Former Premier Wins Narrowly in Iraq
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at Al.
271.
The Sadrists received a majority of INA's seats, giving them significant
leverage in the government formation negotiations. Anthony Shadid, Radical Cleric
Regains Sway in Iraqis' Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at Al.
272.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 6, fJ 11. Signaling its frustration with
the current government, the Iraqi public reelected only sixty-two members of the CoR.
Dawisha, supra note 38, at 27.
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action." 273 On April 19, the EJP ordered IHEC to conduct a manual
recount in the Baghdad electoral district, giving al-Maliki a partial
victory. 274 The EJP found that some of the 501 and 502 forms (the
forms that certified that the number of ballots in each box equaled
the number of voter signatures) had not been signed by the election
station chief.275 Citing Evidence Law No. 107 of 1979, the EJP stated
that "it goes without saying that [public] documents have to be signed
by the employee or person who has the legal authorization to do a
public service" and that such documents "shall lose [their]
characteristic of being a public document" if not properly signed. 2 76
The EJP also noted that "ten secret informers working within the
Independent High Electoral Commission. .. pointed to many
violations that they were eyewitness to and about which they
informed the competent officials but were not listened to." 277 The
EJP thus ordered IHEC "to recount manually all results of all
electoral stations

in the electoral centers . . . in

the Province of

Baghdad for the general election."2 78 The EJP rejected al-Maliki's
request for a manual recount in the provinces of Salah al-Din, Anbar,
and Ninewah.2 79
The effect of the EJP's decision would be to delay certification of
the election results by at least a month because it required IHEC to
recount more than two million votes, 20 percent of the total votes
cast.280 International observers were concerned by the prospect of
delay and worried that the recount could cause SoL to overtake
Iraqiyya in seat distribution, a result that would further stoke Sunni
frustration and lead to additional challenges to the election results. 2 81
Nevertheless, the EJP's decision to order the recount is
understandable given the extremely narrow margin of victory for
Iraqiyya (0.5 percent), and recounts are not uncommon in democratic
electoral processes. 282 Granting al-Maliki's petition for a recount in a
pivotal province was also an important step in defending the
legitimacy of the electoral results.

Williams & Nordland, supra note 270, at Al.
273.
Iraq Election Panel Orders Baghdad Vote Recount, MIDDLE E. ONLINE, Apr.
274.
19, 2010, http://www.middle-east-online.com/englishl?id=38508.
Electoral Judicial Panel, decision No. 37/66Appeals/2010 of April 19, 2010.
275.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.
Id.
Arraf, supranote 267.
280.
See id. (stating that at least one UN observer "hoped the final results could
281.
be declared as soon as possible").
Many states in the United States, for example, require automatic recounts
282.
if the margin of victory is below a certain percentage point. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
§ 102.141(7) (2011) (mandating a recount if a candidate is defeated by 0.5 percent or
less).
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As IHEC started the recount, al-Maliki returned to the courts in
an attempt to prolong the certification process. In addition to the
manual recount ordered by the EJP, al-Maliki requested that IHEC
compare voters' signatures on voter records against each of the
ballots cast in Baghdad. 283 IHEC rejected al-Maliki's request, 284
again demonstrating its independence from political pressure. IHEC
explained that it would conduct the recount by first comparing the
number of ballots in each ballot box against the number of voter
signatures listed on the 501 form; if the signatures equaled the
number of ballots, IHEC would reseal the ballot box and write
"matching" on a new 501 form. 285 "If they [did] not match, the
register [would] be opened and the signatures [would] be totaled
and ... compared again with the number of [ballots] in the box." 286
Al-Maliki appealed IHEC's decision to the EJP. Two days later the
EJP stated: "Whatever the merit of either IHEC's opinion or the
Appellant's claim, this Panel does not have competency to decide that
point, because the decisions of the [IHEC] Board of
Commissioners ... are procedural in nature and non final."287 The
EJP added that al-Maliki could challenge only a final decision by
IHEC, "namely announcing the final results." 288
IHEC completed its recount on May 16, announcing that there
would be no change in seat allocation and largely putting to rest any
doubts about the integrity of the election results.2 89 Al-Maliki chose
not to mount yet another challenge to the results and focused his
efforts on courting other blocs to form a majority alliance.
Meanwhile, IHEC forwarded the results to the FSC for certification.
Two weeks later, after the EJP and Cassation Chamber completed
the de-Ba'athification appeals, discussed supra, 29 0 the FSC certified

the election results, 291 thus concluding an electoral process that left
many Iraqis frustrated with the lack of progress and the deteriorating
security situation. 29 2

283.
Arraf, supra note 267.
Id.
284.
285.
Electoral Judicial Panel, decision No. 390/391/Appeals/2010 of May 5, 2010
(translation on file with authors).
286.
Id.
287.
Id.
288.
Id.
289.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1883 (2009), 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/2010/406 (July 29, 2010). Two
candidates were replaced by other candidates from the same list due to a change in the
number of individual votes cast. Id.
290.
See supra Part III.C.
291.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 289, 6.
292.
Id. 50; see also Khalid al-Ansary, Iraq Election Recount Over, No Fraud
Found, REUTERS, May 14, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/14/us-iraqelection-idUSTRE64D3Y220100514 ("Dozens have died in attacks carried out since the
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The real challenge, however, lay ahead. As one commentator
noted, "An election does not a democracy make." 293 No single political
alliance won the majority of seats necessary to unilaterally form the
CoM, meaning that the deeply divided alliances would have to reach
an agreement on who would occupy positions of power in the new
government. It also remained to be seen whether Iraqi political
leaders' commitment to democracy would be contingent on democracy
serving their own interests. 294
V. GOVERNMENT FORMATION
The surprisingly strong electoral showing for Iraqiyya
precipitated another constitutional showdown, as Prime Minister alMaliki refused to concede that Iraqiyya had the right to form the
government, and the CoR failed to form a government in accordance
with the timeline set forth in the Constitution.
A. The Largest Bloc
Pursuant to Article 76 of the Constitution, "[t]he President of the
Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of
Representatives bloc with the formation of the Council of Ministers
within fifteen days from the date of the election of the President of
the Republic."29 5 The ensuing debate focused on the meaning of "the
largest Council of Representatives bloc." Allawi asserted that
Iraqiyya won more seats than any other pre-electoral alliance and
was therefore the largest CoR bloc. 296 AI-Maliki, on the other hand,
asserted that the President was required to select the nominee from
the largest post-election bloc.297
On March 25, pursuant to a request by al-Maliki, the FSC
clarified the meaning of Article 76:
[T]he expression 'the largest bloc' means either the bloc formed after
the election through the electoral list which ran for the election under
one number and won the largest number of seats or the bloc which is

ballot by suspected Sunni Islamist insurgents seeking to exploit the political vacuum
and tensions between Sunnis and Shi'ites.").
293.
Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., It's Up to Iraqis Now. Good Luck., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A27.
294.
See Dawisha, supra note 38, at 39 (noting that the political leaders suggest
that the commitment to democracy is contingent on some benefit accruing to their
personal capacity, such as obtaining the prestigious position of Prime Minister).
295.
Article 76, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
296.
Iraqi Court Seals Secular Bloc's Election Margin but Shiites Still Likely to
Form Government, FOXNEWS.COM, June 1, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/

06/0 1/iraqs-court-ratifies-election-results-declares-secularist-iraqiya-bloc-biggest/.
297.
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formed of two or more lists which ran for election under different names
or numbers and then coalesced into one entity in the Council of
Representatives. Either of these that has the largest number of seats is
the bloc whose nominee the President must call upon to form a
29 8
government at the first meeting of the Council of Representatives.

Thus, according to the FSC, the election results did not necessarily
determine which party had the first right to form a government.
That privilege would go to whichever party was able to form a
coalition with the largest number of seats by the time the CoR was
sworn in. This result left the door open to both al-Maliki and Allawi
and further prolonged the government-formation process.
Allawi publicly dismissed the FSC opinion and even alleged that
the FSC did not have jurisdiction to answer the question posed by alMaliki. 29 9 In an op-ed in the Washington Post, Allawi wrote: "As the
winner of the election, our political bloc should have the first
opportunity to try to form government through alliances with other
parties. Yet Maliki continues seeking to appropriate that option for
his party, defying constitutional convention and the will of the
people."3 00
The FSC opinion was largely perceived, both in Iraq and
internationally, as politically motivated.3 0 1 The Court did not explain
how it reached its interpretation of Article 76, and this failure to
explain undoubtedly contributed to the criticism. The meaning of
Article 76, however, was hardly clear at the time the Constitution
was enacted. Records from the constitutional committee contain few
clues as to the drafters' intent,30 2 and the provision, as with many

298.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 25 of 2010, available at
http://www.gjpi.org/2010/03/28/federal-supreme-court-opinion-on-article-76-of-theconstitution-concerning-the-nomination-of-the-prime-minister.
299.
Reidar Visser, Iraqiyya Challenges the Jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme
Court, IRAQ & GULF ANALYSIS (Mar. 31, 2010, 7:52 PM), http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/
2010/03/31/iraqiyya-challenges-the-jurisdiction-of-the-federal-supreme-court.
300.
Ayad Allawi, The Risk of Losing Iraq, WASH. POST, June 10, 2010, at A19.
301.
One commentator stated: "In a disappointing reversal of the earlier (and
more democratically principled) understanding of Article 76, the Supreme Court
adopted al-Maliki's reading of Article 76." Jason Gluck, A Step Backwards for the Iraq
Judiciary, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONS
(Mar.
31,
2010,
8:13
AM),
http://www.comparativeconstitutions.org/2010/03/step-backwards-for-iraqi-judiciary.html. A
New York Times article similarly implied that the Court had succumbed to political
pressure: "[A] day before the results were announced, [al-Maliki] quietly persuaded the
Iraqi [S]upreme [C]ourt to issue a ruling that potentially allows him to choose the new
government instead of awarding the right to the winner of the election, the former
interim prime minister, Ayad Allawi." Rod Nordland, Maliki, Trailing in Iraq Vote, Is
Contesting the Result, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A4. It added "there could be
widespread dissatisfaction if Mr. Maliki were given the first opportunity to form a
government." Id.
302.
Reidar Visser, The Hamudi Files and Article 76, IRAQ & GULF ANALYSIS
(June 10, 2010, 3:05 PM), http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/2010/06/10/the-hamudifiles-and-article-76.
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other contested articles, was likely left intentionally vague.30 3 After
the Constitution was enacted, politicians continued to debate the
meaning of this provision. 304 Ironically, prior to the elections, Sunni
politicians argued for the interpretation ultimately given by the
FSC.30 5
There are reasons to believe that the Court reached the more
First, the premise of
reasonable interpretation of Article 76.
parliamentary democracy is that the executive is linked and
responsible to the legislature. 306 The chief executive is chosen by
Parliament and can ultimately be dismissed by it.307 In practice, this
means that unless one party wins an outright majority, election
results generally leave open a number of different coalition
possibilities, requiring parties to negotiate among themselves to form
a government that will gain the support of a majority of
Parliament. 30 8 A party's bargaining power generally increases with
30 9
but a mere
the number of seats that it wins in the elections,
the right
will
have
a
party
that
guarantee
not
does
seats
of
plurality
3 10
government.
the
form
to
The FSC's opinion reinforces the principle that the executive's
right to govern is derived from parliamentary approval rather than
the percentage of votes it receives in the national election (as is the

See Feldman & Martinez, supra note 14, at 916 ("In many cases, the
303.
imprecision of the final text was not the result of sloppy drafting or carelessness, but
rather the product of conscious strategies by competing drafters to defer certain
contentious political issues for resolution in the future.").
304.

Id.

Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Iraqi High Court's Understated Rise to
305.
Legitimacy, JURIST (Apr. 23, 2010), http://jurist.law.pitt.edulforumy/20lO/O4/iraqi-highcourts-understated-rise-to.php.
Jean Blondel, Introduction to CABINETS IN WESTERN EUROPE 1 (Jean
306.
Blondel & Ferdinand Milller-Rommel eds., 2d ed. 1997).
See id. (noting the inability of the "government" to exist absent the consent
307.
of Parliament).
MICHAEL LAVER & NORMAN SCHOFIELD, MULTIPARTY GOVERNMENTS: THE
308.
POLITICS OF COALITION IN EUROPE 89 (1998).
Id. at 175.
309.
See generally CABINETS IN WESTERN EUROPE, supra note 306 (providing an
310.

overview of cabinet government functions in several European countries). The May
2010 elections in the United Kingdom provide a timely example. In those elections, the
Conservative Party won a plurality of the seats in Parliament. See Alan Travis, Hung
Parliament:David Cameron Has Momentum, but Brown Still Has Power, GUARDIAN,
May 7, 2010, at 6. Gordon Brown's, the incumbent Prime Minister, Labour Party won
the second greatest number of seats, while the Liberal Democrats came in third. Id.
Prime Minister Brown stated that he would respect the Conservative's right to enter
into discussions with the Liberal Democrats to form a ruling coalition, but left open the
possibility of a Labour-Liberal Democrat alliance if discussions between the
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats failed. Id. Such a result would have excluded the
Conservatives, the single largest party, from the government.
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case in presidential systems).3 11 It would be pointless-not to
mention a waste of time-for the President to charge the nominee of
the largest pre-election bloc with forming a government if another
bloc has succeeded in establishing a post-election majority alliance.
In such a circumstance, the majority alliance would refuse to approve
the proposed CoM, thereby obliging the President to charge the
nominee from the alliance with government formation. The FSC
opinion thus acknowledged that, from an operational standpoint,
whichever pre-election bloc is able to form a post-election majority
alliance will ultimately form the government, and there is little point
to go through the formality of having a minority bloc propose a CoM
that will not be confirmed.
For this reason, in most other
parliamentary democracies, the head of state does not nominate a
Prime Minister until it is clear that the nominee will be able to
survive a vote of confidence. 312
The FSC opinion is also supported by a textual argument.
Article 76 specifically refers to the largest "Council of
Representatives" bloc.3 13 There arguably cannot be a "Council of
Representatives bloc" until the CoR is convened by the President and
sworn in. If the framers of the Constitution had wanted to inhibit
post-election alliances, they could have given the right to form the
government to the "electoral list" or "electoral bloc" that won the most
seats.
B. The (On Again Off Again On Again) First Session of the CoR

As the debate between al-Maliki and Allawi raged, President
Talabani called the CoR to session on June 14, 2010, as required by
Article 54 of the Constitution. 314 In the first session, the CoR's
primary constitutional duty was to elect the Speaker and two Deputy
Speakers.3 15 When the session was called, however, there was no

311.
Chibli Mallat, Supreme Court's Opinion of Article 76 of the Iraqi
Constitution, DAILY STAR (Beirut), Apr. 1, 2010, http://www.mallat.com/LawPageDS/
Note1April2010a.pdf.
[T]he choice of the prime minister is premised on his chances to form a
government that gets a vote of confidence, and this always depends on the
coalition he is capable of forming after the election. There is no point in
nominating the head of the largest bloc if he is incapable of getting his
government past the vote of confidence which ultimately determines in a
parliamentary system such as Iraq's the validity of the Council of Ministers
and the beginning of its rule.
Id.
312.
313.
314.
315.

See LAVER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 308, at 208-10.
Article 76, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 289, 1 7.
Article 55, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
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agreement on whom to elect as Speaker. 3 16 This position would likely
be part of a larger package that would include the Prime Minister,
President, and key ministers. 317 Accordingly, the Acting Speaker,
Fuad Massoum, suspended the first session nineteen minutes after
the COR convened.3 18
Negotiations continued throughout the summer with little
progress. Allawi and al-Maliki each asserted that they had the right
to form the government,3 19 and discussions on a unitary government
went nowhere. Instead, both sides worked furiously to gain the
support of the INA and the Kurdish Alliance in order to reach the
magic number of 163.320 In May, SOL and INA struck a tentative deal
to form a new alliance, the National Alliance, giving them 159 seats,
4 short of a majority. 321 The formation of this alliance, however, did
not end the deadlock. INA and SoL were unable to agree on the
alliance's candidate for Prime Minister. 322 ISCI distrusted al-Maliki's
secular tendencies and was concerned about his attempts to
consolidate power in the executive branch throughout his first
term. 323 The Sadrists were even more opposed to nominating alMaliki for a second term as Prime Minister, because they still
resented al-Maliki for his decision to forcefully disarm the Mahdi
Army, a Sadrist paramilitary group. 324 Allawl continued to argue
(especially to predominately Sunni countries and Western diplomats)
that his party had the right to form the government and that Sunnis
would resist any government that did not include a significant role for
Iraqiyya. 32 5

Jane Arraf, Iraq ParliamentSits; PoliticiansSay New Government Months
316.
Away, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 14, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Middle-East/2010/0614/Iraq-parliament-sits-politicians-say-new-government-monthsaway.
317.
Id.
318.
Ned Parker, Iraq's New Parliament Holds Its First Session as Political
Deadlock Continues, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2010, at A7.
319.
See, e.g., Arraf, supranote 316 (noting that Allawi argued that the two-seat
lead in the election entitled him to form government; conversely, al-Maliki contends
that his alliance's greater number of seats gave it that right).
Marina Ottaway & Danial Kaysi, Iraq: Movement Without Progress,
320.
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE (Oct. 18, 2010), http://carnegieendowment.org/
publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41743.
Steven Lee Myers, Shiite Blocs Unite, Bolstering Their Parties and
321.
Ensuring Continued Control in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2010, at A5.
Id.
322.
323.
KIRK H. SOWELL, NURI MALIKI, THE SHIA FACTIONS AND IRAQ'S PROVINCIAL
COALITIONS 2-3 (2009),
http://www.kirksowell.com/Content/Documents/Maliki,%
(detailing ISCI
20Shia%2OFactions%20and%2OIraq's%20Provincial%20Elections.pdf
uneasiness at al-Maliki's power consolidation measures and, although the extent that
ISCI religious objections exceed political objections remains unclear, their eventual
depiction of al-Maliki as an ally of the "infidel occupier").
324.
Basim al-Shara, Sadrists Seek Role as Kingmakers in Iraq, MIDDLE E.
ONLINE, Sept. 14, 2010, http://www.middle-east-online.comenglishid=41320.
325.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 289, 8.
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Amid an ominous surge in violence and the planned departure of
U.S. combat troops by August 31, the international community
stepped up its efforts to broker a deal that would establish a national
unity government. 326 Ad Melkert urged leaders to work together
"with a higher sense of urgency" to form a government.3 27 The
United States supported a proposal to establish a new position for
Allawi as the head of a "council on national strategy," which would
provide a check on the Prime Minister's powers and potentially
facilitate a satisfactory power sharing arrangement. 328
Al-Maliki's chances of gaining the premiership improved in
October when the Sadrists dropped their opposition to a second term,
reportedly in return for control over key ministries. 329 Al-Maliki still
lacked support, however, from ISCI (who supported Vice President
Adel al-Mahdi) and the Kurds (who demanded concessions regarding
Kurd autonomy before backing a candidate for Prime Minister).33 0
The FSC was required to intervene in the moribund governmentformation process again after an independent watchdog group
requested that the Court order the CoR back to work.3 31 The plaintiff
argued that the Interim Speaker's decision to keep the first session
open indefinitely "violated the Constitution and caused the delay in
the government formation for a long time which caused, and [was]
still causing, a direct harm to the interests of the citizens in
general."3 32
The FSC noted that the Constitution requires the CoR to elect
the Speaker and two Deputy Speakers in its first session.3 3 3 The CoR
is also required to elect the President within thirty days of first
convening, so that the President can assume constitutional duties,
"particularly, tasking the nominee (of the parliamentary bloc with the

Sam Dagher, Iraq Weighs Solution to Logjam: Politicians Discuss New
326.
FederalPost that Would Balance Power, Clear Way to Form a Government, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 16, 2010, at A7.
Press Release, UNAMI, Sec. Council Extends UN Presence in Iraq for
327.
Another Year (Aug. 5, 2010). Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon also expressed his
concerns: "I am concerned that continued delays in the government formation process
are contributing to a growing sense of uncertainty in the country." Id. "Not only does
this risk undermining confidence in the political process, but elements opposed to
Iraq's democratic transition may try to exploit the situation." Id.
Dagher, supra note 326, at A7.
328.
Jane Arraf, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki: Iraq Within Days of
329.
2010,
8,
Oct.
MONITOR,
SCI.
Ending Political Stalemate, CHRISTIAN
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1008/Iraqi-Prime-Minister-Nourial-Maliki-Iraq.within-days-of-ending-political-stalemate.
Ottaway & Kaysi, supra note 320.
330.
Iraqi Court Orders Parliament to Meet Amid Stalemate, AL ARABIYA, Oct.
331.
24, 2010, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/10/24/123500.html.
Al-Mahkama Al-Ittihadiyya Al-'Ulya, decision No. 56/federal/2010 of
332.
October 24, 2010 (translation on file with authors).
Id.
333.
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highest number) to form the Council of Ministers." 334 The FSC held
that the CoR's failure to perform these duties "within the
constitutional time limits" and the indefinite suspension of the first
session "constitute[d] a breach of [the CoR's] mandate." 3 5
Accordingly, the FSC decided to "compel the Defendant, in his official
capacity as the Interim Speaker of the CoR, to invite the CoR to
convene and resume the tasks of its first session as stipulated in
Article 55 of the Constitution."33 6 In a departure from its customary
practice, the Court also took the opportunity to rebuke the CoR by
stating that its failure to act "signal[ed] a deficiency in the pillars of
the republican parliamentary system . .. [and moved] governance
away from the democratic path chosen by the people when they voted
on the Constitution and when they expressed their choice through
ballot boxes to elect their representatives in the legislative
authority."3 37
Interim Speaker Massoum stated that he had no choice but to
follow the Court's order. He would "call the leaders of the political
blocs for a counselor's meeting and expect[ed] to announce the date
for the first session by the end of [the] week."33 8 The CoR reconvened
on November 11, 2010, after the main political blocs reached a
tentative power-sharing agreement that promised to end the political
gridlock.3 39 Allawi agreed to concede the premiership to al-Maliki,
who had solidified political support from the Shia blocs in recent
months. In exchange, Allawi would assume a new post as head of the
National Council for Higher Strategies, whose powers and
responsibilities would be set forth later in implementing
legislation. 340 In addition, the CoR would exempt three prominent
candidates of the Iraqiyya Alliance, including Saleh al-Mutlaq, from
the de-Ba'athification process. 34 1
The CoR proceeded to elect members from the three main sects
to top posts. Jalal Talabani (Kurd) was reelected as President and

334.
Id.; see also Article 72, Section 2(B), Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005
(providing that the President shall continue to exercise duties until the election of the
new President).
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 56/Federal/2010.
335.
336.
Id.
337.
Id.
Hamid Ahmed, Iraqi Court Forces ParliamentBack to Work, ASSOCIATED
338.
PRESS, Oct. 24, 2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.cominews/2010/
oct/24/iraqi-court-forces-parliament-back-work.
3-4; see also Steven Lee Myers,
339.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 289,
Reversing Course, a FormerHoldout Pulls Iraq Toward a PoliticalAnchor, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2010, at A20 (detailing how Allawi's decision to join the alliance paved way for
the formation of a new government).
340.
U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 289, 4.
341.
Id.; see also Jack Healy, Parliament Vote Puts Iraq Closer to a New
Government, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at A10 (discussing the change in political
dealings following the reinstatement of the disqualified candidates).
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Osama al-Nujafi (Sunni) was elected as Speaker of the Parliament.
Immediately following his reelection, President Talabani asked Nuri
al-Maliki (Shia), the Prime Minister designate, to form a new
government. On December 21, the CoR approved the CoM proposed
by al-Maliki (albeit with a few key ministers yet to be determined),
ending a nine-month political saga that sorely tested Iraq's
commitment to democracy. 34 2
VI. AN EMERGING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: REALIZING
"THE GREATEST CHALLENGE"343

The 2010 elections provide an opportunity to reflect on the Iraqi
judiciary's progress in establishing the rule of law and its
commitment to judicial independence. On both counts, there are
reasons to be cautiously optimistic. Throughout the elections saga,
the FSC has diffused politically charged controversies, promoted
political dialogue and consensus, and issued decisions that are legally
defensible.
To realize the concept of an independent judiciary envisioned in
the Constitution, the Court has had to act as the consummate
politician, encouraging consensus and political compromise through
earnest dialogue and fostering public confidence in the rule of law
and the democratic process, while ensuring that the true political
branches comported with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
This was, and remains, no easy task. The Court has succeeded in this
endeavor remarkably well, navigating the most delicate issues in an
infant democracy in a way that has enhanced its legitimacy as an
independent and neutral arbiter of issues pivotal to national
cohesion.
Courts in new democracies, particularly in post-conflict societies,
must proceed cautiously, casting opinions to develop political support
and refraining, to the extent possible, from moving ahead of public
opinion as they work to establish the judiciary as an impartial body
through which to resolve disputes regarding governance. 344 The FSC

John Leland & Jack Healy, After Months, Iraqi Lawmakers Approve a
342.
Government, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A6.
343.
See John G. Roberts, Jr., William H. Rehnquist: A Remembrance, 31 VT. L.
REV. 431, 436 (2007).
[Elstablishing an independent judiciary is the greatest challenge for emerging
democracies. In some sense, getting to the point of a free election is the easy
part. What is hard is establishing a judiciary that is capable of enforcing the
rule of law against the government as well as against the governed.
Id.
344.
(1997).

Jonathan Zasloff, The Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. REV. 795, 862
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appears to understand these dynamics well. Its opinions throughout
the electoral saga evince a focus on adherence to the Constitution and
the fundamental rights enshrined therein, an effort to avoid direct
engagement with the substance of highly sensitive political issues, a
commitment to drafting narrowly tailored opinions, and an operating
theory of judicial restraint geared toward promoting political
dialogue. Although much room for growth remains, the FSC can find
the fruits of its labor thus far in the executive and legislative
branches' compliance with its decisions and in lower and
administrative courts that practice the same philosophy of judicial
restraint.
A. Upholding the Constitution: The FSC's Charge and Chief Objective
The Court has not shied away from demanding compliance with
the Constitution. Perhaps no case is more illustrative than the
decision invalidating Article 15 of the 2005 Election Law. 345 On the
heels of the elections establishing the first post-invasion Parliament,
the Court was presented with a potentially explosive question: was a
provision of the law by which the new government was elected invalid
under the terms of the new and narrowly approved Constitution? To
invalidate Article 15 of the Election Law could risk undermining the
legitimacy of the new government at a critical juncture in the
country's development. To uphold it could weaken respect for the
country's foundational document and subject the Court to claims that
it had bowed under political pressure to support the nascent
leadership.
The Court also must have understood how difficult it would be to
adhere strictly to the terms of Article 49(1) of the Constitution, which
requires one parliamentary representative for every "100,000 Iraqi
persons representing the entire Iraqi people."34 6 As discussed in Part
II.B, accurate census data was not available or feasibly attainable for
resident Iraqis, let alone for Iraqis abroad.
Amid these challenging circumstances, the Court rendered a
clear and forceful opinion: "article (15/second) of the elections law No.
16/2005 presents clear violation to article (49/second) of the
constitution" and is therefore invalid under Article 13(2) of the
Constitution.347 The Court's opinion furthered Iraq's long-term
interest in preserving the Constitution's mandate that all Iraqi people
wherever situated are entitled to the same degree of democratic
representation. As was later demonstrated in the 2010 electoral
process, a challenging political environment and limited resources do
345.
2007.
346.
347.

Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 15/t/2006 of April 26,
Article 49, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 15/t/2006.
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not excuse the need to work towards realization of the constitutional
mandate.
The Court also addressed a second challenge that Article 15 was
incompatible with Article 31(A) of the TAL, the body of law that
governed the country during the elections and until the new
Parliament was seated. 348 The Court, denying the petitioner's claim,
found that there was no contradiction between the two provisions,
which were "[i]n fact . .. consistent," and the claim accordingly was

not "based on [a] sound legal basis." 349 Although critics could argue
that the newly seated government would not be representative of the
people under the new Constitution, the Court firmly backed the
legitimacy of the process by which the government was elected under
the relevant law at the time, and it thereby issued a reasoned opinion
that both upheld the Constitution as the law of the land and
preserved the legitimacy of the elected government.
The Court's dedication to upholding the Constitution is also
evident in its opinion clarifying the election deadline date.35 0
Interpreting relevant articles of the Constitution, the Court had
plausible arguments for holding either that the first session began on
the date that the CoR first convened or that the first session occurred
five weeks later on the date that the CoR performed its first session
duties.35 1 Although the latter conclusion would have given the CoR
more time to resolve the immediate crisis, it would also have cut
against Iraq's long-term interests in establishing a stable and reliable
form of government, a fact that is readily apparent in light of the sixReflecting the
month stalemate on government formation.
Constitution's mandate for peaceful transition of governments with
set electoral terms, the Court's decision to use the earlier date
provided an incentive for the CoR to act in a timely manner or risk
the political cost of being perceived to unconstitutionally extend its
mandate.
The Court also focused the public eye on the CoR in its October
24 opinion determining that the CoR's indefinite open session was
unconstitutional. 352 Despite the dangers of wading into a political
controversy of this magnitude, the Court issued a forceful decision,
clearly stating that the CoR cannot alter or act beyond the

348.
Id. Article 31(A) provides: "The National Assembly shall consist of 275
members. It shall enact a law dealing with the replacement of its members in the event
of resignation, removal, or death." Law of Administration of the State of Iraq During
the Transitional Period of 2004. The new Parliament did in fact consist of 275 members
under Article 15's calculus of registered voters. Id.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 15/t/2006.
349.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 29/Federall2009 of May
350.
13, 2009.
Id.
351.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 56/Federal/2010 of
352.
October 24, 2010.
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constitutional parameters of its term and calling for the CoR to
reconvene.3 5 3 This decision indicated the Court's growing confidence
as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.

B. The FSC's Methodology
As this Article demonstrates, the Court was presented with
many difficult and critical issues in the run-up to the 2010 election.
Its opinions, perhaps intentionally, have not always evinced the same
measure of firmness or included a detailed analysis. The FSC is a
young court in a country where judges who dared to flout instructions
from Saddam's regime were often removed or imprisoned.3 5 4 In
developing democracies generally, judges face threats to their
physical safety and job security, and it is far from certain that
political officials will comply with judicial orders.3 55 Under such
conditions, "[s]trategic self restraint is the best course for judges in
new democracies when faced with cases in which major state actors
show considerable interest."356 The FSC has demonstrated such
restraint, as well as a sophisticated political acumen, through
opinions that are process focused, narrowly tailored, and pragmatic.
1.

Judicial Restraint

Where possible, the Court has refrained from opining on matters
of substance in controversial issues. The FSC has not formally
developed a political question doctrine, which would be difficult given
the Court's advisory jurisdiction.3 5 7 Nevertheless, its opinions have
concentrated on the precise issue under debate and have refrained
from opining on constitutional issues that do not require immediate
resolution. Moreover, the FSC has relied on judicially manageable
standards for resolving issues brought before it, which has helped to
mitigate criticism that its opinions are politically motivated. Just as
judges seeking to protect their courts in new democracies will
sometimes seek to avoid deciding cases against powerful political

Id.
353.
See, e.g., A. Kevin Reinhart, Professor of Religion, Dartmouth Coll.,
354.
Reconstruction and Constitution Building in Iraq, Address at Vanderbilt Univ. Law
Sch. (Jan. 23, 2004), in 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 765, 781 (describing an Iraqi judge
who had been jailed for invalidating one of Saddam's edicts on property as
unconstitutional).
355.
Peter Vondoepp, Politics and Judicial Assertiveness in Emerging
Democracies: High Court Behavior in Malawi and Zambia, 59 POL. RES. Q. 389, 390
(2006).
Id. at 391.
356.
See, e.g., Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 29/Federal/2009
357.
of May 13, 2009. This opinion was issued in response to a direct request by the Speaker
of the Council of Representatives.
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actors,3 58 if a court must decide such cases, it benefits from framing
the issue so that the outcome does not appear to merely favor one
political actor over another.3 5 9
The Court's opinion on the constitutionality of Vice President alHashimi's veto of the Election Law amendments provides a good
example. The question presented by the CoR-whether the "reasons
upon which [al-Hashimi] based his abstinence to the first amendment
for the election law" were constitutional 360-could have provided the
Court with an opportunity to reinforce its opinion invalidating Article
15 of the Election Law or to otherwise comment on the
constitutionality of the content of the proposed amendment, thereby
choosing sides between the legislative and executive branches. The
Court also could have opined on the contours of the veto power, an
issue upon which the Constitution itself is silent but which was not
necessary to resolve the instant political debate. 361 The Court chose
to steer clear of these potential minefields in an opinion that provided
simply, if somewhat obtusely, that the amendment raised a
constitutional question and that members of the Presidency Council
could refrain from approving legislation that they thought to be in
conflict with the Constitution. 362
In 2007, the Court again took this approach, limiting its holding
on the constitutionality of Article 15 of the Election Law to a
determination that the text of Article 15 was incompatible with

358.
359.

Vondoepp, supra note 355, at 391.
Zasloff, supra note 344, at 843.

The judicial system in an emerging democracy must act in such a way that
citizens will look to it and not to violence as a way of resolving social and even
political disputes. Judges in a fragile democracy, then, must self-consciously act
with a political goal in mind: enhancing their own authority. Their rulings
must be calculated to attract favorable opinion about the judiciary as an
institution.

Id.
360.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 72/Federal/2009 of
November 19, 2009, available at http://www.gjpi.org/wp-content/uploads/fsc-opinion-72of-2009.pdf.
Article 138, Section 5, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005.
361.
362.
See supra Part III.B. This strategy is reminiscent of that successfully
employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
In Fletcher, the Court had to choose between affirming a Georgia legislature's
rescission of title to land grants originally made by the State in exchange for bribes,
which had since changed hands, and affirming the prior legislature's transactions. Id.
at 87-88. Rather than examine legislative motivations, which Chief Justice Marshall
opined could only be undertaken "with much circumspection," the Court centered its
opinion on the established principle of vested rights, distilling the issue to simply "a
question of title." Id. at 130, 133. Like the Marshall Court, the FSC in the Hashimi
veto case "diffused a heated political controversy and evoked little negative comment
because it avoided dealing with the politics of the issue." Zasloff, supra note 344, at
858.
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Article 49(1) of the Constitution. 363 Finding that voter registration
records were not a suitable proxy for determining parliamentary
representation under the Constitution, the Court did not opine
further on what mechanisms would comport with Article 49(1) (for
instance, a new and wholly representative census), leaving that issue
to the political branches. 364 This strategy reaped dividends in the alHashimi veto case: if the Court had specified criteria for voter
representation, it would have been called upon to determine whether
the new amendment comported with those parameters, potentially
igniting an already controversial issue and casting doubt on Iraq's
ability to hold legitimate elections.
2.

Promoting Political Dialogue

The Court's opinions have underscored the need for political
consensus and accommodation within the bounds of the Constitution.
In issuing such opinions, the Court has demonstrated its long-term
outlook on the development of a democratic system by creating case
law that resolves the core legal questions necessary for resolution of a
dispute while providing space for the political process to move
forward.
The Court's opinion determining the method for calculating the
ten-day veto window provides a useful illustration. 365 Once the Court
affirmed that al-Hashimi's veto was constitutional, the CoR returned
to session to address his concerns.36 6 However, some members still
argued that the window for a veto had passed and al-Hashimi's threat
was therefore inconsequential. 367 On December 3, 2009, the Court,
noting that Article 138(5) of the Constitution was silent on this
question, extrapolated from the method set forth in the Civil
Procedure Code of 1969 to determine that the ten-day window could
not expire on a holiday and therefore would expire on December 6.368
The Court's opinion relied on established legal procedures,
369
reinforcing the general rule outlined in the Civil Procedure Code.
In doing so, the Court implicitly acknowledged-as had its earlier
opinion on the veto itself 3 7 0-that the underlying basis for al-

Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 15/t/2006 of April 26,
363.
2007.
Id.
364.
365.
See supra Part III.B.
366.
Hamoudi, supranote 305.
367.
Id.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 76/Federal/2009 of
368.
December 3, 2009. Article 25, Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code 83 of 1969 provides:
"[Iun case the period ends during an official holiday, it is extended to the following
working day."
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 76/Federal/2009.
369.
Id.
370.
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Hashimi's and other Sunni politicians' opposition would have to be
reconciled through political dialogue and consensus building. To
foreclose the legal avenues enabling such compromise could upset the
entire electoral process and alienate a significant portion of the
population. The Court's opinion, set out in neutral terms that-to the
extent it was not already so-made the result appear preordained,
drew political actors back into the dialogue at a critical juncture,
further establishing the judiciary as an independent branch with a
particular, well-defined role to play in the process of governance.3 71
The Court's pragmatic approach to these divisive political issues
may best be exemplified by its post-electoral interpretation of the
Constitution's instruction that the government be formed by "the
nominee of the largest Council of Representatives bloc."3 72 Whether
this provision referred to the largest pre-election or post-electoral
coalition was a hotly contested issue even before the elections, with
SoL and Iraqiyya both flipping their positions once the election
results were announced.37 3 This question became critical to postelectoral government formation because of the narrow margin
separating SoL and Iraqiyya. 374 Without the Court's blessing, a
prevailing opinion by either party would be subject to serious
question, and yet by taking up the issue, the Court took the very real
risk that it would be maligned or undermined by one side or the
other.3 75
Taking a Solomonic approach, the Court opined that the "largest
Council of Representatives bloc" could refer to either the largest
electoral bloc or a post-electoral majority alliance, whichever "of these
ha[d] the largest number of seats."376 This opinion left the door open
to both Allawi and al-Maliki, promoting further political dialogue on
who would ultimately make up the CoM. Although the Court may be
criticized for equivocating and thus contributing to a prolonged,
contentious, and potentially destabilizing government-formation
process, the Court's opinion underscores that the Constitution's
requirement that the CoM be approved by a majority of Parliament
makes political compromise an inevitable necessity.3 77

Zasloff, supra note 344, at 850-51; Article 76, Doustour Joumhouriat al371.
Iraq of 2005.
372.
Article 76, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq of 2005 ("The President
of the Republic shall charge the nominee of the largest Council of Representatives bloc
with the formation of the Council of Ministers within fifteen days from the date of the
election of the President of the Republic.").
373.
Hamoudi, supra note 305 (noting that for months prior to the election "[tlhe
provision had been deeply and seriously debated in legal and political circles").
374.
See supra Part V.
375.
Hamoudi, supra note 305.
376.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 25 of March 25, 2010.
377.
See supra Part V. It would be pointless for the President to charge the
nominee of the largest pre-election bloc with forming a CoM if another bloc has
succeeded in establishing a post-election majority alliance since the majority alliance
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The Court's opinion was framed in a politically neutral manner,
thereby avoiding the appearance that it favored one political party
over the other. Although Iraqiyya initially voiced displeasure at the
ruling,3 78 this measured decision, which perhaps took into
consideration the spectrum of anticipated reactions3 79 and which was
"of potentially enormous consequence," was accepted by the major
parties.3 8 0 The Court was thus able to defuse a potentially incendiary
debate and further reinforce its position as a neutral arbiter of critical
disputes.
The Court's October 24 opinion was also designed to break the
political stalemate that was threatening to undermine the democratic
process. By rebuking the CoR for its failure to comply with its
constitutional mandate, the Court pressured political leaders to
negotiate a compromise and increased the costs for those politicians
who were perceived to be dragging out negotiations or making
unreasonable demands. 3 8 ' At the same time, the Court did not
demand that the CoR meet by a specific date, perhaps out of
awareness that a violation of such an order could undermine the
Court's legitimacy in the long-term.
B. The Court's Legitimacy as Head of an Independent
Third Branch of Government
As the cases concerning Iraq's 2010 parliamentary elections
illustrate, the Federal Supreme Court, under challenging
circumstances, has done a remarkable job of strengthening its
position as Iraq's independent, impartial, and capable high court.
The Court's growing stAture is further evidenced by executive and
legislative branch compliance with its decisions, some of which
required decisive action on critical issues in divisive political
It is also evident in lower and administrative court
climates.
emulation of the Court's judicial posture, especially in the context of

would simply refuse to approve the proposed CoM, thereby requiring the President to
charge the alliance's nominee with forming the government.
See Allawi, supra note 300, at A19 (admitting the political necessity of a
378.
coalition government); Visser, supra note 299 (making a structural argument for the
benefits of coalition building).
See Vondoepp, supra note 355, at 389 ("[Slcholars have indicated that
379.
judges make decisions based significantly on the anticipated reactions to those
decisions by other institutional and political actors.").
380.
Hamoudi, supranote 305.
381.
See Anthony Shadid, Iraqi Court Issues Ruling for Parliament to Return,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2010, at A4 (commenting on the Court's order for Parliament to
resume its sessions or face further court action); IraqiCourt Orders Parliamentto Meet
Amid Stalemate, supra note 331 (quoting interim Speaker Fuad Massoum's belief that
the decision "will accelerate the government formation," and that he expects to
schedule a session within days of formal receipt of the Court's opinion and consultation
with parliamentary blocs).

384

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 44:331

the de-Ba'athification crisis and the vote recount in Baghdad
Province.
1.

Compliance with FSC Decisions

"Executive noncompliance with judicial review is a particularly
acute problem in younger constitutional systems and in the systems
of less-developed countries."38 2
In such systems, a judiciary's
"assertions of binding judicial review often bring more constitutional
harm than constitutional benefit, particularly when executive or
governmental noncompliance provokes constitutional or political
crisis that the fragile, emergent constitutional order is not yet strong
enough to weather."3 8 3 Judges in transitional democracies must
accordingly seek to avoid the potentially destabilizing effects of an
executive challenging the court to enforce its opinions against the
government. 384
Fortunately, such a scenario has not played out in Iraq.
Government actors and political candidates largely have complied
with FSC decisions, due in large part to the manner in which the FSC
has addressed the delicate issues brought before it.385 Far from
overreaching, the Court provided political actors with a critical
framework within which to negotiate by structuring its opinions to
require adherence to the Constitution while leaving open maximum
space for resolution of these difficult issues. In this manner, the
Court has facilitated the pre-electoral and post-electoral political
process and has encouraged Iraqi politicians to continue to bring such
matters before it for resolution. 386
One potential outlier to the general compliance with the FSC's
opinions is the Iraqi government's failure to hold the elections on or
before January 30, 2010.387 The election took place more than one
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Michael William Dowdle, Of Parliaments,Pragmatism, and the Dynamics
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reported reply to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
"Justice Marshall has written his opinion-now let him enforce it").
Permutations of Judicial Power: The New
385.
Shannon Roesler,
Constitutionalism and the Expansion of Judicial Authority, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
545, 558 (2007) (noting that federal government compliance with court decisions
adverse to the government's interest can be an important indicator of judicial
independence, particularly when those decisions have profound effects on political
power).
Id. at 557 ("Constitutional drafters create constitutional courts with broad
386.
review powers when they cannot guarantee their reelection in order to ensure they
have a forum in which to challenge adversaries.").
387.
Al-Mahkama al-Ittihadiyya al-'Ulya, decision No. 29/Federal/2009 of May
13, 2009.
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month later, on March 7, owing to the combination of the veto
controversy and the AJC's de-Ba'athification efforts. In post-conflict
societies, however, "partial deviation from strict adherence to
democratic norms might be justified based on certain conditions that
often prevail in transitional societies."3 88 In Iraq's case, reaching
political consensus on the Election Law-and thus avoiding a boycott
similar to the Sunni boycott in 2005-was arguably more important
to the democratization process than holding the elections by the
deadline mandated by the Constitution. Furthermore, the delay in
the elections is not a sign that Iraq's leaders disregarded the FSC's
decision. Iraqi politicians took the prospect of a delay seriously and
openly acknowledged that the political deadlock was constitutionally
problematic, implicitly affirming the validity of the FSC's opinion.
President Talabani, for instance, voiced his concern that
postponement would create a constitutional vacuum and delegitimize
the sitting government.3 89
In the midst of the veto and de-Ba'athification issues-either of
which, if handled differently, could have destroyed hope for a
popularly accepted, credible election-the government recognized
that the stakes were too great to press on with the election before
first resolving the questions that could undermine its legitimacy. It is
notable that government actors again turned to the courts to help
them address the Election Law and de-Ba'athification challenges.
Rather than intentionally and blatantly flouting the FSC's holding,
government actors sought the judiciary's assistance to move forward
with an election as soon as possible. In this sense, the pressure to
avoid an unconstitutional delay of the election strengthened the role
of the judiciary, as the political branches turned to the courts for help
in guiding the country through a number of difficult and weighty
issues.
2.

The FSC Model in Lower and Administrative Courts

The FSC's efforts to establish itself as a neutral and independent
arbiter have further cemented the judiciary's role in Iraq.
Throughout the events preceding and following the election, Iraqi
political actors relied heavily on the EJP and Cassation Chamber, in
addition to the FSC, for necessary guidance. Iraq's lower courts did
not disappoint. Like the FSC, they rendered clear and focused
opinions that reflect a nuanced understanding of difficult issues and a
measured approach in resolving conflicts without alienating
interested parties, with the effect of keeping political actors engaged
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in dialogue to further the electoral and government-formation
processes.
In addressing the AJC's disqualification of fifty-two additional
candidates just days prior to the election, the EJP provided a salient
example of Iraqi lower courts' skill at crafting legally sound and
equitable holdings. As more fully discussed in Part III, the EJP
determined that IHEC lacked the statutory authority to disregard the
AJC's disqualification of candidates. 3 90 Notwithstanding logistical
difficulties, the EJP held that IHEC should have crossed off the
disqualified names from the printed ballots, as instructed, and
notified the candidates of the AJC's action so that they could appeal
their disqualifications to the Cassation Chamber.3 9 1 The EJP
engaged in a rather extensive treatment of the question to provide
firm statutory support for its holding. 392 In instructing IHEC to
refrain from counting votes for the disqualified individuals, however,
the EJP also indicated an available avenue for relief: candidates
whose disqualifications were overturned by the Cassation Chamber
would have their votes reinstated.39 3 The EJP was able to grant
SoL's petition to invalidate IHEC's unauthorized action without
prejudicing the rights of the newly disqualified candidates, thus
maintaining equilibrium among the political parties at a time when
every vote was of critical importance.
The EJP also skillfully balanced competing interests in its
decision to order a recount in Baghdad Province. Once initial election
results had been announced, al-Maliki sought full recounts in four
critical provinces. 394 The EJP, however, determined that evidence
did not support the need for recounts in Salah al Din, Anbar, and
Ninewah Provinces.39 5 In responding to a subsequent al-Maliki
petition, the EJP held that the method by which IHEC chose to
conduct the recount was not ripe for review until the recount results
were announced. 396 With the election results at a virtual tie between
SoL and Iraqiyya, the EJP demonstrated a remarkable agility in
responding to al-Maliki's demands in a manner that provided

See Electoral Judicial Panel, decision Nos. 38 and 39/47/Appeal/2010 of
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necessary and justified recourse to review yet maintained the
integrity of IHEC's review process.
The Cassation Chamber's opinion upholding the current AJC as
a caretaker commission further illustrates the Iraqi judiciary's ability
to help resolve political deadlocks. As more extensively discussed in
Part III, at the height of the de-Ba'athification controversy, the
Cassation Chamber was asked to address the legitimacy of the AJCa question of enormous importance for the elections and the perceived
legitimacy of those who would be elected-and to vet the appeals of
candidates that the AJC had disqualified from running for office.
Although the Cassation Chamber initially decided to consider these
issues after the elections, public concern over de-Ba'athification
vetting continued to mount and threatened to derail or delegitimize
the elections unless resolved.39 7 At the urging of Parliament and
after receiving the necessary evidence from the AJC, the Cassation
3 98
Chamber determined that it would conduct an immediate review.
The Cassation Chamber's opinion took a careful and focused
approach in noting that the AJC law, which replaced the HNDBC
law, did not clearly dissolve the HNDBC, although it did change the
399
commission's name and institute certain new procedures.
Accordingly, the Cassation Chamber determined that Chalibi and alLami were acting legitimately as caretaker commissioners until the
seven-member panel required by the law could be confirmed by the
This opinion, supported by principles of statutory
CoR. 400
construction, furthered the electoral process in confirming a
necessary, though not ideal, framework for meeting the constitutional
requirement that candidates for Parliament be screened for ties to
the Ba'ath party. 40 ' It also went a step further to review individual
appeals of AJC disqualifications and to provide appropriate redress
for candidates against whom there was insufficient evidence of
disqualifying Ba'athist activity.40 2 By calming the AJC controversy
in a manner that ensured both that constitutionally mandated deBa'athification review would proceed and that candidates'
constitutional rights would be protected, the Cassation Chamber
achieved an appropriate balancing of competing interests that
political parties could endorse.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Since its establishment in 2006, the FSC has played an integral
role in Iraq's nascent democracy, positioning itself as the authority on
constitutional interpretation and as an independent, neutral arbiter
of intergovernmental disputes. In the past year, FSC and lower court
opinions have guided Iraq through the organization and execution of
its first parliamentary elections under the 2005 Constitution. These
elections were accepted by the Iraqi people and the international
community as fair and credible, and they have furthered political
dialogue in facilitation of the post-electoral government-formation
process. In rendering these opinions, Iraqi courts have demonstrated
judicial restraint and conservative balancing of competing interests,
and these skills have furthered the ability of political actors to reach
necessary agreements at critical junctures.
Democracy in Iraq has made great strides in a brief period of
time, yet much remains to be accomplished and many significant
challenges remain for the Iraqi people and their government. Despite
the difficulties that lay ahead, Iraq has cultivated a significant
resource in its strong and independent judiciary, which will assist
Iraq as democratic governance continues to take shape.

